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Hunvald and Zimring: Hunvald: Whatever Happened to Implied

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO IMPLIED .CONSENT?
A SOUNDING*
EDWARD H. HUNVALD, JR.**
FRANKLiN E. ZimRING***
I. INTRODUCON

A. Statement of the Problem
Efforts to control drunk driving have relied primarily upon the use of
the criminal process. Driving while intoxicated is a crime in every state
and a violation of city ordinance in most municipalities that attempt to
regulate traffic. One assumption commonly expressed about criminal controls is that the effectiveness of criminal law as a means of control increases
as the process becomes more efficient in the apprehension and conviction
of those who violate the law. It has been felt that one of the problems in
the enforcement of drunk-driving laws is the difficulty in obtaining convictions. A variety of chemical tests to determine the amount of alcohol in
the blood are more reliable and more convincing evidence of intoxication
than the unsupported testimony of an arresting officer concerning the
driver's demeanor. The results of such tests are admissible in evidence in
most jurisdictions. However, if a suspected drunk driver refuses to submit
to a test, there is usually no method of acquiring this evidence 'Without the
use of force, an undesirable and possibly illegal alternative.'
*This is a report of a study conducted by the American Bar Foundation for
the Department of Transportation, National Highway Safety Bureau under contract FH-11-6687. The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed are those of
the authors and not necessarily those of the National Highway Safety Bureau or
the American Bar Foundation. The authors wish to express their appreciation to
Mr. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Executive Director, American Bar Foundation, for
his generous and intelligent counsel.
The efforts and ingenuity of Paul T. Lyon, Michael H. Maher, John L.
Oliver, Jr. and Larry G. Schulz, law students at the University of MissouriColumbia, produced the data upon which this article is based. Their success in
data collection would not have been possible without the cooperation provided by
police departments of St. Louis and Kansas City, the Missouri Highway Patrol,
the prosecuting attorneys of St. Louis and Kansas City, and the Missouri Department of Revenue. The individuals who assisted are too numerous to list. However,
we would like to express particular thanks to Mr. James M. Martin, Manager,
Administrative Analysis, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
***Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), while holding that the
taking of a blood sample without consent in appropriate circumstances did not
(323)
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To solve this dilemma, a number of states enacted what are popularly
called "implied consent" laws. In general these laws provide that anyone
possessing a license and operating a vehicle on the state highways has given
tacit consent to being tested for blood-alcohol content should he ever be
arrested for drunk driving. If the arrested driver refuses to submit to the
test, a report of his refusal is made to the state licensing agency and his
driver's license may be suspended or revoked. Thus, the implied consent
law provides a means of compelling submission to a blood-alcohol test.
'Implied consent laws are aimed at a reduction in the amount of drunk
driving. They could reduce the incidence of drunk driving and deter potential offenders by increasing drunk-driving convictions and by forcing
suspected drunk drivers who refuse tests to surrender their driving privileges.
If implied consent laws do, without disproportionate cost, aid in controlling drunk driving, then they can be very useful in improving highway
safety. It is the aim of this study to discover whether evidence of the effects
of implied consent laws can be obtained from existing records and, if so, to.
discover what the effects of the laws are.
B. Approack
It was decided to study the operation of an implied consent law in St.

Louis, Missouri, where it was felt that the records systems would be readily
accessible. Missouri enacted an implied consent law in October 1965 and
is one of a group of midwestern states having such laws; it was thought

that the Missouri experience with the law might be typical for a large
portion of the United States. St. Louis is a large city and could be expected
to provide a sufficient number of cases to be statistically reliable. Moreover,
St. Louis is both a city and a county governmental unit; the geographical
limits are the same for both state and city ordinance enforcement, and,
most important, the law enforcement records are centrally maintained with
only a single traffic law enforcement agency, the St. Louis Police Department.

Data was gathered from records kept in St. Louis,, from the Department of Revenue in Jefferson. City (the. state capital), and from other
sources, where investigation showed it would be helpful.,The Department
of Revenue is the state agency which administers the suspension of licenses
violate either the prohibitions against self-incrimination or illegal search and
seizure, indiAted that if the act were done in -an unreasonable or offensive manner,

it would violate the constitutional rights of the "donor."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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under the- Missouri' implied consent law. The plan was to determine the
effect of the implied consent law on the police, the prosecuting authoritiesi
and the public by considering the effects of implied consent in the following
areas:
1. The techniques of the police in handling drunk-driving cases.
2. The degree of police enforcement of drunk-driving laws.
3. The consequences of the police enforcement techniques on convictions, revocations of licenses, etc.
4. The public response to implied consent.
In each of these areas the following were considered:
a)
b)
c)
d)

The criteria that could be used to indicate response.
Whether information to measure these criteria was available.
Whether the data indicated any changes.
Whether the changes, if any, could be attributed to a particular
cause.
e) Whether the changes noted were good or bad from the points
of view of administrative convenience, prevention of undesirable consequences, and fairness to persons involved.
At the outset it was intended to limit the study to the St. Louis area
and to use possibly some state-wide figures (such as those of the Highway
Patrol) for general comparison purposes. However, while examining the
files on license revocations made under the implied consent law in the Department of Revenue in Jefferson City, it was noted that Kansas City
had far more revocations for refusal to consent to the test than did St.
Louis. Further inquiry disclosed that the enforcement system in Kansas
City differed significantly from that in St. Louis. It was then decided to
expand the area under study to include Kansas City. With this additional
information it would be possible to compare the effect of the implied consent law on two different systems of enforcement.
While Kansas City is a part of several counties, for all practical purposes it is under a single unified enforcement system. Nearly all of the
drunk-driving arrests in Kansas City are made by the Kansas City Police
Department, and nearly all the prosecutions are brought in the Kansas
City Municipal Courts.
C. Procedures
Four students from the School of Law at the University of Missouri in
Columbia were used as research assistants. During the summer of 1967,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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they visited various offices-police, prosecutors, etc.-in St. Louis and Kansas City as well as the Department of Revenue and the Highway Patrol in
Jefferson City. With the cooperation' of the officials of these agencies,
the student researchers acquired the information upon which the study is
based.
D. Analysis of the Law
The Missouri Implied Consent Law. In 1963, in the 72nd General Assembly of Missouri, Senate Bill 76 was introduced. This bill proposed an
implied consent law utilizing a blood test.2 The bill, however, was easily
defeated. During the same session the legislature revised the Missouri law
punishing drunk driving. Prior to 1963, driving while intoxicated was a
felony punishable by a maximum of five years' imprisonment; 3 the new
law made driving while intoxicated a graded offense, with the first two
offenses being misdemeanors, the third and subsequent offenses being
felonies.&4 The reason most commonly given for this change was that, if
conviction for driving while intoxicated was a felony on the first offense,
there was difficulty in obtaining convictions, especially before a jury. After
the 72nd session, a Joint Interim Committee, appointed to consider a general revision of all traffic laws, undertook to study the advisability of
adopting an implied consent law. Sources of legislative history in Missouri
are sparse, but from the Committee records it appears that the -Committee
did little more in the area of implied consent than to hold hearings. There
is no evidence that they made any careful study into the effect of'implied
consent laws already in existence in other states or made any effort to
obtain statistical data on the effectiveness of such laws.
From the evidence taken at the hearings held by this committee,
most of the support for an implied consent law came from the Kansas City
area. Kansas City had been using breath tests since about 1951, and according to the testimony of various police chiefs, the law was effective.
Several judges from the Kansas City area testified that the law was needed.
Many of these witnesses concluded that the use of an implied consent law
would decrease drunk driving although none of them presented any data
to support this conclusion. There was some support from the rest of the
state, but most of the witnesses were from the Kansas City area. The Mis2. The sponsors were probably relying upon Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M.
385, 271 P2d 827 (1954), aff'd 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
3. See § 564.440, and 564.460, RSMo 1959.
4. § 564.440, RSMo 1967 Supp.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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souri Highway Patrol strongly backed the law, claiming that their traffic
summaries showed a correlation between alcohol and traffic accidents. The
St. Louis County Coroner and representatives of several insurance companies, also supported adoption of such a law.
In its final report the Joint Interim Committee recommended that an
implied consent law be passed. The 'law recommended differs slightly from
the bill, which had been patterned after the implied consent law of New
York, that was introduced in the General Assembly. Although there was
vigorous opposition, the bill passed without much significant debate.
The impression is that the law was considered by its supporters (and
by a majority of the legislature) to be a "good thing" which would result
in reducing drunk driving. There is no indication that there was any careful
analysis of how the law was to accomplish this end. One legislator who was
a strong supporter of the law became a little indignant when he was interviewed during this study and asked exactly how the law was going to be
effective. His attitude was basically that it obviously was going to be so.
As stated earlier, the aim of an implied consent law is to control drunk
driving. Its name comes from the statutory provision that any person
operating a motor vehicle "shall be deemed to have given consent to ...
a chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his blood. . . ." The "consent," of course, is fictional. What the
law provides is a means of compelling submission to the test-the compulsion
being the threat of license revocation for refusing.
There must be a valid arrest and reasonable grounds for the arresting
officer to believe the driver is intoxicated.6 After the arrest, the officer requests that the driver take the test. The officer is required to inform the
driver of the reasons for the request and that refusal to submit may result
in the revocation of his driver's license Thus, under the Missouri statute,
the choice facing the arrested driver is either to submit to the test and
provide the state with convincing evidence of the degree of his intoxication,
or to refuse and lose his operator's license for one year.
The results of the chemical test are admissible in evidence and establish certain presumptions. If the test shows 0.05% or less "by weight of
alcohol in his blood," the driver is presumed not to be intoxicated. If the
test registers over 0.05% but less than 0.15%, then there is no presumption
5. § 564.441, RSMo 1967 Supp.
6. § 564.441, RSMo 1967 Supp.

§ 564.444,of RSMo
Published7.by University
Missouri 1967
SchoolSupp.
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either of intoxication or of sobriety, but the evidence may be. considered.
If the test registers 0.15% or higher, this is "prima facie evidence that the
person was intoxicated at the time the specimen was taken." 8
There are other factors involved in this choice. One is the criminal laws
of both the city and the state that prohibit drunk driving. Another is the
Missouri Point Revocation Law. This law, originally passed in 1961, superseded a prior law which allowed revocation of a driver's license subsequent
to a conviction for driving while intoxicated or for any felony involving a
motor vehicle. The point system substituted for this law provides for assessment against a driver of points after conviction of traffic offenses. The
number of points varies according to the offense; for instance, a drunkdriving conviction under state law carries 12 points, while a similar conviction under city ordinance carries only 6 points. Accumulation of a certain
number of points in a set period results in suspension or revocation of the
driver's license. If 12 points are accumulated in a 12-month period, the
license is revoked for one year.9 A conviction under state law for drunk
driving will result in revocation of license; conviction under city ordinance
will not, unless the individual has, from other convictions, accumulated
additional points.
The law on the use of blood-alcohol tests in evidence prior to the
implied consent law was not extensively litigated. Such evidence had been
used and its use approved. The Missouri cases of State v. Kelton and State
v. Daugherty'° indicate that such evidence is admissible if the person consents to the test; without his consent there was doubt whether such evidence would be admissible.' 1 One reason for the use of the implied consent
fiction in these laws was to get around the possibility of an argument that
taking the evidence without the consent of the individual would violate the
privilege against self-incrimination. With Schmerber v. California as authority 12 it was relatively easy for the Missouri Supreme Court to uphold
the constitutionality of the Missouri implied consent law.' 3
Sclhmerber indicated that under the proper circumstances no consent
was needed to attempt to compel a test to determine blood-alcohol content.
8. § 564.442, RSMo 1967 Supp.
9. § 402.304, RSMo 1967 Supp.
10. State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957); State v. Daugherty, 320
S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959). Both of these cases involve manslaughter convictions.
There were no reported cases dealing with the use of such evidence in the prosecution of drunk driving.

11. See State v. Matsinger, 180 S.W. 856 (Mo. 1915).
12. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
13. See Blydenburg v. Davis, 413 S.W. 284 2d (Mo. 1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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It therefore could be possible to have a law dispensing with the need for
consent. However, there would still have to be. an arrest and reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving while intoxicated and the test
would have to be taken in a reasonable manner, which might be impossible
if the driver were physically to attempt to prevent the test from being
given. It is, however, paradoxical that the, implied, consent law takes its
form from the fear that some fiction of consent -was needed to avoid violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and yet it is now clear there
is no violation of self-incrimination involved in requiring a person to take
the test.

14

II.

EFFECTS OF THE LAW: ARREST AND TEST PROCEDURES

A. Techniques of Police in Handling Drunk Driving Cases
St. Louis processing of drunk driving cases differs from that of Kansas
City. While in both cities the initial decision to instigate the process rests
with the police officer, the procedure varies once the decision to arrest is
made.
St. Louis. The St. Louis police follow what can be described as a centralized system of processing drunk-driving cases. The chemical test is
administered in the central police headquarters where all drivers who consent to the test are brought for testing. The pattern for disposition following a drunk-driving arrest is that described earlier: the driver is informed
of his option to take the test, the consequences of refusal, and that he will
be booked on a state charge of driving while intoxicated. If the driver refuses to be tested, he is taken to an outlying District Station and booked.
(He may also be taken to a hospital for examination for injuries.) If the

driver consents to being tested, he will be taken by cruising patrol (a system
of transporting persons arrested from the District Stations to the Central
Police Headquarters) to the Prisoner Processing Division of the central
headquarters where the test is administered. Normally if the test indicates
less than 0.15%o, the driver is not prosecuted for any drunk-driving offense
(although he may be prosecuted for some other offense). If the test indi14. Implied consent laws have been commented on many times. See, e.g.,
1950 WASH. U. L. Q. 108, 1960 WASH. U. L. Q. 84, 9 ST. L. U. L. J. 283 (1964),
and 12 ST. L. U. L. J. 287 (1967), all of which deal specifically with Missouri.
See generally 51 MicH. L. REv. 1195 (1953), commenting on the first implied
consent law; Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxica'tion, 45 N. C. L. REv. 34 (1966); Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and.the Motorist:
Practicaland Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. Rzv. 673 (1960);
31 U. CHi.
L. REv.of603
(1964);
1967
UTAu L.Repository,
REv. 168.
Published
by University
Missouri
Schooland,
of Law
Scholarship
1968
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cates 0.15% or higher, the police will try, and they usually succeed, to obtain a blood test in addition. It is felt that the blood test is more reliable
than the breath test,
I
If the driver is to be charged with a drunk-driving offense .(either upon
refusal to submit to the test or upon failing the test), he will be booked.
If he has refused to take the test, the officer will fill out the required affidavit and mail it to the Director of Revenue in Jefferson City.
The centralized St. Louis process requires the arresting officer to stay
with the driver throughout the test procedures. A study made by the St.
Louis'police indicated that on the average a one-man patrol car wia be out
of service for two hours and forty-two miutes investigating and processing

a drunk-driving case. This is, however, only the time the patrol car is out
of service. The car may be returned to duty with another driver. The time
involved for the arresting officer (including the time spent applying for warrants at the prosecutors' offices) was estimated to be from five to eight
hours. While some of this time will involve investigation of the accident (if
there was one), arranging for the removal of the driver's car, etc., a substantial portion of the time is taken by transporting the arrested driver to
police headquarters and processing him there.
The next step is for the police officer to present his evidence (including
the test results) to a prosecutor's office. The city prosecutor handles violations of city ordinances while the circuit prosecutor handles violations of
state laws. The procedures for presenting drunk-driving cases to the prosecuting authorities underwent changes during the period under study; these
changes will be discussed later. In general, the most recent procedure is
for the police officer first to present the case to the circuit prosecutor. If
the prosecutor decides to take the case, he will "issue the warrant," and
the prosecution will be brought under state law. If the circuit prosecutor
refuses to issue the warrant, the officer will then present the case to the city
prosecutor for a decision on whether to prosecute. As a general practice, the
circuit prosecutor will not prosecute any case where the test was not given
or was given and showed less than 0.15%.
Thus, when the officer has decided to arrest a driver on a charge of
drunk driving, he no longer controls the handling of that case. Once the
driver is arrested, he is "frozen" into the system and the officer's discretion
is very limited or nonexistent. The arresting officer's only control is with
his initial discretion about whether to initiate the process.
Kansas City. The Kansas City process, by contrast, is a decentralized
system. Blood-alcohol tests are administered in five districts throughout the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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city. Upon arrest the officer will take the driver to one of these five district
stations. The officer will give the necessary warnings. If the driver refuses
to submit to the test, the required affidavit is filled out and mailed to the
Director of Revenue in Jefferson City, and the driver is booked on a charge
of drunk driving in violation of the city ordinance. It seems probable that
no booking is made of consenting drivers until after the test is administered.
One test machine operator reported from his observations that any test
showing 0.10%o or higher will result in charging. A test result of less than
0.10% is "passing," and no charges are brought. It is likely that many of
the names of those who "pass" the test never appear as an arrest on any
record. No studies have been made in Kansas City as to the time involved
in processing a drunk-driving case, but officers there estimated it would
take approximately one and a half to two hours.
Once the decision to charge has been made, the process in Kansas City
is still handled by the police in the same manner as any other serious traffic
violation. There is no formal application to the prosecutor's office, as in St.
Louis. Nearly all charges are brought under the city ordinance, and it is
rare for state prosecution to be considered. The officer is responsible for
bringing the case to court, which includes obtaining witnesses, if there are
any. It is quite normal for the first contact with the city prosecutor's office
to be in court.
Thus the arresting officer in Kansas City has more control over the
disposition of a drunk-driving case than the St. Louis officer. He must make
the same initial decisions about arrest but, unlike the St. Louis officer, he
can decide, once the test is administered, whether the case should go forward or be dropped. The arrested driver is not "frozen" in the system until
after he refuses the test or has taken the test. The officer can use the test
results to decide whether to continue the criminal process, and once he has
decided to proceed he is not dependent upon a further decision by the
prosecutor.
B. Criteria To Indicate Changes in Police Technique
of Handling Drunk-Driving Cases
In both Kansas City and St. Louis tests to determine blood-alcohol
content had been used prior to the implied consent law. The number of
tests, both absolutely and in relation to the number of arrests, gives some
indication of whether the law had an effect on police techniques of handling
a drunk-driving case. The implied consent law provided the threat of
license revocation to compel the arrested driver to submit to the test; prior
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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to the law, only persuasion could be lawfully used to obtain consent to the
test. The law thus could change the pressure the police used to obtain consent and also the attitude of the police in using pressure to obtain consent to the test. To compare the pressure used, some indication of the
tactics used to obtain consent prior to the law is needed.
C. Data To Measure the Criteria
Information indicating the number of drunk arrests and the number
and results of blood-alcohol tests are kept by both the St. Louis and Kansas
City police departments. In St. Louis the test results are kept in a log
book, and the information on the tests was obtained by manual count from
this log book. When the implied consent law went into effect in the fall of
1965, the St. Louis Police Department was using a balloon-type 'testing
device. The law required the testing machine to be approved by the State
Division of Health, and this balloon-type device was not approved. The
St. Louis police department did not obtain an approved device and operator
until January 1966, and thus the implied consent law was not actually in
operation in St. Louis until then. Table I shows the number of tests administered by the St. Louis police.
TABLE I
Tests for Blood-alcohol Given by St. Louis Police Department
No.

St. Louis
o6 Tests Given

P

x
M

A

x

J

J

A

S

0

31

15

18

16

21

10

13

14

12

20

1965

9

11

14

16

9

9

16

16

22

21

1966

*49

63

48

62

46

39

37

37

45

42

1967

49

47

40

40

43

21

26

25

19

26

1964

D

TOTAL

18

197

30

28

201

46

46

560

20

35

391

N

'9

*10 tests in January 1966 were of the old balloon type. After this
all tests were on an intoximeter approved by the State Division of
Health.

In Kansas City the police had been using a breath-test machine of the
type later approved by the State Division of Health so the implied consent
law became effective there in October 1965. Table II shows the number of
tests administered by the Kansas City Police.
In both cities studied records are kept of each test administered. By
manual counting of these records the number of tests given was determined.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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TABLE II
Tests for Blood-alcohol Given by Kansas City Poliee Department

1964

79

No.

1"oTfe-S-sven

K
F

M

A

M

J

J

A

S

0

N

D_

TOTAL

118

116

120

103

98

71

98

92

I00

67

86

1148

150

1074

1965

104

67

68

77

75

77

73

80

77

111

115

1966

170

123

167

191

161

127

130

118

142

156

157

181

1823

1967

189

157

196

158

244

144

117

103

136

150

158

219

1971

The increase in the number of tests given after the effective date of the
implied consent law could have been the result of more drunk-driving
arrests and not necessarily indicate a change in police techniques in handling
drunk-driving cases. It is therefore necessary to compare the number of
tests given with the number of drunk-driving arrests made. Both St. Louis
and Kansas City use computers for their police records. We requested and
received monthly drunk-driving arrest totals for 1964 through 1967. It was
apparent, however, that these records contained serious inaccuracies.
In St. Louis in 1965 a change was made in the computer program and
the drunk-driving arrests were not reprogrammed correctly. The error was
obvious, since, according to the computer, there were only three such arrests
during the last nine months of 1965. To obtain reliable figures, the student
researchers made a manual count of drunk-driving arrests from the Daily
Arrest Register for 1965.
The St. Louis computer figures for 1966 and 1967 also proved unreliable. Because of changes in the handling of drunk-driving prosecutions by
the city and circuit prosecutors' offices, the police began issuing "double
summons"; that is, in most instances of drunk-driving arrest the officer would
charge twice, once for a violation of city ordinance and once for a violation
of state law. This practice occurred for approximately the last half of 1966
and the first half of 1967 when the practice was discontinued. To correct
these deficiencies, the St. Louis Computer Center ran a new program for
1966 and 1967 which reflected the number of persons charged with drunk
driving. It is believed these arrest figures are the best obtainable. The St.
Louis arrest figures are shown in Table III.
The Kansas City arrest figures also disclosed inaccuracies. The figures
for 1964 showed an average of 199 arrests per month for the first eleven
months. The arrests for December 1964 were recorded at 640. The explanation for the apparent sudden increase in arrests was that, in programming
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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the computer during 1964, some arrests were not entered. These were
lumped together and put in the December total. The yearly total is correct,
but the monthly totals for 1964 are inaccurate.
TABLE III
Arrests on Driving While Intoxicated Charge
St. Louis
if--f---esta

J

E

M

A

M

J

3

A

S

0

N

D

45

65

61

57

73

47

75

TOTAL
819

1964

85

88

73

71

79

1965

75

61

58

68

72

63

68

84

97

71

77

104

898

1966

72

97

78

96

68

61

64

68

71

90

83

77

925

79

67

76

70

81

41

50

47

37

45

36

64

693

1967

TABLE IV
Arrests on Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) Charges
Kansas
City
Ndo.1oF
Arrests
J

F

M

A

M

J

J

A

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

1964*

82

107

221

333

171

261

205

196

153

249

209

640

2827

1965

99

160

138

210

140

164

193

139

224

191

153

426

2237

1966

211

166

218

210

182

145

175

141

207

224

180

282

2341

1967

248

222

250

209

226

184

166

173

189

202

201

290

2560

*The 1964 figures are not correct for monthly totals. To correct for
mistakes made in programming (mistakes discovered in late 1964), all
arrests which had been overlooked were placed in December total. The
yearly total is assumed to be correct.

The drunk-driving arrest figures for 1965, 1966, and 1967 are reported
to be correct. There are indications that some of the arrest figures may not
be accurate reflections of the number of arrests made. In 1965, the average
monthly arrests for the first eleven months was 165. The arrests indicated
for December 1965 are 426, indicating the possibility that again arrest figures
from earlier months were placed in the December totals. This, however,
could not be verified. The Kansas City arrest figures are shown in Table IV.
The Kansas City figures also indicate that during several months the
number of persons submitting to the test and those refusing to submit were
greater than the number arrested. Technically, this is impossible since an
arrest is a prerequisite to a test. The most logical explanation (other than
questioning the reliability of the monthly totals of drunk-driving arrests)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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is that those persons who submitted to the test and who "passed" were
never recorded as having been arrested and thus do not appear in the
drunk-driving arrest total.
It is difficult to obtain information about the pressures that police put
on individuals to take the test before the implied consent law was passed.
Such information could have been acquired by extensive interviewing of
police officers, but such interviews were beyond the scope of this study.
Some information was obtained through informal conversation with police
officers.
D. Change
In both St. Louis and Kansas City there was an increased use of the
chemical test after the implied consent law. In the two-year period from
January 1964 through December 1965, the St. Louis police averaged slightly
more than 16 tests per month.
For the two-year period 1966 and 1967, after the approved testing
equipment was installed, the St. Louis monthly average was 39.6 tests. The
increase was large in 1966, with a monthly average of 46.7 tests. This rate
of testing continued for the first five months of 1967 (monthly average 43.8
tests), and then the number of tests dropped sharply in the last seven
months of 1967, averaging only 24.6 tests a month. This drop corresponded
to the sudden simultaneous drop in the number of persons arrested in St.
Louis for drunk-driving offenses. The increase in the number of tests after
January 1966 is due in part to the increase in the number of persons arrested
for drunk driving, as this provided more individuals who could be asked to
submit to the test. However, the percentage of tests given also rose sharply
after the implied consent law. In the two-year period from January 1964
through December 1965, 23.2% of the drivers arrested for drunk-driving
offenses took a blood-alcohol test. In January 1966 the percentage tested
rose to 68.1%o and the percentage tested remained over 60% through June
1966. After June 1966, the percentage varied between 46.7% and 70.1%.
For the two-year period, 1966 and 1967, the percentage tested was 58.8%.
Even after the drop in mid-1967 in the number of arrests and tests, the
percentage of those tested remained fairly constant at slightly more than
50%.
Kansas City also shows an increase. In the period January 1964 through
September 1965, Kansas City police averaged 88 tests per month. From
October 1965 through December 1967 Kansas City averaged 154 tests per
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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month. The percentage of drivers tested also shows an increase. From
January 1964 through September 1965, 43% of drivers arrested were tested;
from October 1965 through December 1967, 73.57o of drivers arrested were
tested. While there was variation from month to month, the over-all upward
trend seems to hold for the period from the effective date of the law to the
end of the study. Thus in both cities there was a greater use of bloodalcohol test after the implied consent law than before.
The arrest and test figures indicate a substantial difference between
the two cities. Although both show an increase in testing after the implied
consent law, Kansas City has far more arrests and tests than does St.
Louis. Prior to the implied consent law, Kansas City averaged 204 arrests
and 88 tests per month, while St. Louis averaged 71.5 arrests and 16 tests
per month. After the implied consent law, Kansas City averaged 210 arrests
and 154 tests per month while St. Louis averaged 67 arrests and 39.6 tests
per month. As mentioned, St. Louis showed a sharp drop in arrests and tests
in the last seven months of 1967. For the first 17 months after the implied
consent law, St. Louis averaged 82 arrests and 45 tests per month. For
the last seven months of 1967 St. Louis averaged only 45.7 arrests and
24.6 tests per month. It is true that the Kansas City arrest figures are
subject to question, but only because there is reason to believe they may
be lower than the actual number arrested. These differences indicate that
the Kansas City police follow a more aggressive 'system of enforcement
of drunk-driving laws than do the St. Louis police. It could also mean that
there is just a great deal more drunk driving in Kansas City than in St.
Louis; however, as will be discussed later, this does not seem a likely explanation of the vast differences noted.
A comparison of arrests to tests and refusals indicates the difference
between enforcement in Kansas City and St. Louis. The refusals reported to
the Director of Revenue in Jefferson City are shown in Table V. In 1966
in Kansas City (after the implied consent law was in operation), there
were 2,341 drunk-driving arrests (according to police records), and 1,823
individuals submitted to testing. According to the records of the Department of Revenue, the Kansas City police sent in (during the same period)
notices of refusal by 712 persons. The 712 refusals plus the 1,823 consenters
total 2,535, which is 194 more than were arrested. As mentioned before, a
possible explanation is that those who "passed" the test never appeared in
the arrest total. The figures for the first five months of 1967 indicate that
the Kansas City pattern continues.
In St. Louis, however, the pattern is different. In 1966 (excluding
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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TABLE V
No. Refusing to Consent to Test Resulting in
Revocation (By Date of Arrest)

J
1965
1966
1967

F

M

St. Louis
A M J J

A

S 0

N

D Total

0 0 1
17 44 36 30

1
307
148

32 67 54
55
67 51 79
49
60 61 61 62 58 59 50
80 71 59 70 71

153
712
351

19 31 25 34 21
26 22 32 29 39

17 15

18

Kansas City
1965
1966
1967

January when the police were not using an approved testing device and
thus were not entitled under the law to report refusals) there were 853
arrests. Of these, 511 consented to be tested. The Department of Revenue
records indicate 288 refusals. The 288 refusals plus the 511 consenters total
799, resulting in 54 persons arrested who neither consented nor refused.
Most, if not all of these missing persons, can be explained as persons arrested
who could not be tested, either because they were badly injured, unconscious,
or were not brought to the testing center until after an extended delay,
which made the giving of the test inadvisable.
While the St. Louis figures balance out much better than the Kansas
City figures-in St. Louis, the number of tests plus the number of refusals
almost equal the number of persons arrested-this may be due to adjustments of the arrest figures in St. Louis. The first figures obtained from the
computers in St. Louis were obviously inaccurate for the years 1965, 1966,
and 1967, and new programs had to be run. As late as June 1968, errors
were discovered in the 1966 figures and a revised 1966 arrest figure was
provided. It may be that some of the corrections were the result of trying
to get the figures to balance. The Kansas City figures contain admittedly
inaccurate monthly totals for 1964 and possibly 1965, and there has been
no attempt in that city to obtain more nearly correct figures.
The results obtained from the tests given in these two cities indicate
significant differences. Taking the periods after the implied consent law
became effective (October 1965 for Kansas City, January 1966 for St.
Louis) through May 1967, the following results were obtained in the tests.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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Blood-Alcohol Content
St. Louis
0.00-0.04%
0.05-0.14%
0.15% and over

Total

Kansas City

No.

%

No.*

%

6
19
737

.8
2.5
96.7

119
820
2,117

3.8
26.3
69.9

762

100.0

3,116

100.0

*Excludes 27 tests for which no result was shown.
For comparison purposes, results of tests administered by the Highway Patrol for 1966 and 1967 are presented here.
Blood Alcohol Content

0.00-0.04%
0.05-0.14%
0.15%o and over
Total

No.

0

88
1,885
6,530

1.0
22.2
76.8

8,503

100.0

The implication is that the St. Louis police bring in for testing (i.e.,
arrest for drunk driving) only those persons who are very drunk. This was
borne out by a St. Louis police officer who commented with pride on the
ability of the St. Louis police to pick out those who will "fail" the test by
scoring higher than 0.15%. The Kansas City police (and the Highway Patrol) arrest a greater sample of the drunk-driving population (and of the
general driving population) as indicated by the percent of scoring less than
0.15%. Several factors contribute to this difference. One may be a difference
in attitude toward the enforcement of drunk-driving laws. Another is the
difference in the "pass-fail" line as far as the test is concerned. In St. Louis,
due in part to the decisions of the prosecuting authorities, the police consider the failure mark for the test to be 0.15%, while in Kansas City the
failure mark may be at the lower level of 0.10%. While there is no hard
and fast rule in Kansas City as to the failure mark, the feeling expressed
there is that if the driver scores 0.10% or higher and appears drunk, he
will be prosecuted for drunk driving. The decision of whether he is to be
prosecuted for drunk driving is largely determined by the arresting officer
who is not required to make that decision until after he has the results of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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the test. The officer is encouraged by this system to arrest in a marginal
case and use the test as an aid in exercising his discretion to institute a
prosecution. In St. Louis the higher failure line encourages arrests only
when the driver appears very drunk. But once the officer has made the arrest, he does not have the discretion to decide whether to institute a prosecution. That decision is made by the breath-test machine and the prosecutors.
If the driver is arrested and takes the test and scores less than 0.15%, then
the arresting officer has, in a sense, made a mistake. If, however, the test
score is 0.15% or higher, the officer has made a good arrest. However, the
officer must make his decision not knowing what the test score will be. This
encourages arrest only in sure cases and discourages arrests in marginal
cases. The difference in test scores indicates that in Kansas City the tests
is used as a screening device-separating the possibly drunk (0.05-0.15%o)
from the very drunk-which the officer uses to determine who is to be
officially arrested and who is not. In St. Louis the test becomes a means of
second-guessing the effectiveness of the officer's judgment in making the
arrest; and while the test in St. Louis "screens" in the sense that persons
who pass the test will be released, the test does not help the arresting
officer in determining who is drunk and who is not. He must base his
decision to arrest solely upon his observations at the scene of the arrest.
Immediately after the implied consent law became effective in St. Louis
there was a slight increase in the number of arrests made. However, the
test results indicate that the St. Louis police were still arresting only the
very drunk. The increase in the number of arrests may have indicated
more police activity in that period, but the activity is still selective as far
as arrests are concerned. The sharp drop in arrests in the last.seven months
of 1967 has no discernable connection with the implied consent law, as there
is no great change in the percentage of drivers submitting to the test or in
the percentage failing the test.
In Kansas City, the number of drivers arrested has steadily increased
from 1965 through 1967. (The arrests for 1964 are higher than any of the
next three years, but the arrest figures for 1964 are of questionable accuracy.)
Compared to St. Louis, the arrest rate for drunk driving in Kansas City
was high before the implied consent law and it continues high after the law.
Prior to the law, Kansas City arrests were 2.77 times those in St. Louis,
and after the law the Kansas City arrests were 3.13 times those in St. Louis.
If only the period before the drop in St. Louis arrests is considered, the
Kansas City arrests are 2.60 times those in St. Louis.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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E. Accounting for the Change
The only change in policing technique, apart from new testing devices
in St. Louis, is that in both Kansas City and St. Louis more people are
tested with the implied consent law than without it. The same change occurs in both the high enforcement system and the low enforcement system.
Clearly the implied consent law effected this change. It is difficult to apportion the change between the coercive aspects of the implied consent law and
the change in police morale which might have made the police more interested in obtaining consent to the test. It seems clear that the threat of
license revocation was a more effective means of obtaining consent of the
arrested driver than the means of persuasion used before the implied consent law.
F. Evauation
In Kansas City decentralized testing makes it possible for the officer to
use the results of the test to exercise his discretion to proceed. In St. Louis
centralized testing reduces the officer's discretion and thus may reduce the
number of persons arrested and tested. Centralized testing also takes time.
This discourages arrests, and means the driver arrested must have been
very drunk to have tested out over 0.15% at a later time. Furthermore,
centralized testing "freezes" the arrested person into an arrest statistic,
which in turn contributes to making police officers conservative about making arrests, except in the clearest cases. The prosecutors' policies in St.
Louis also reduce police incentive (discussed infra).
If the intoximeter is a better screening device than the observations
of the officer, and this much is clear, then Kansas City has a better screening system than St. Louis. If it is desirable to encourage arrests of more
drunk drivers-even at the cost of necessarily arresting a few nondrunk
drivers in the process-then the Kansas City pattern is preferable as it
encourages arrests in marginal cases still leaving the officer the discretion
to release those arrested after the test results are known.
The results in Kansas City and St. Louis do indicate a positive benefit
of the implied consent law: One of the purposes of the law is to increase the
number of tests for blood-alcohol content, and it does that in both systems.

III. THE DEGREE OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT
A. The Measure of Enforcement
The most obvious measure of enforcement of drunk-driving laws is
the number of persons arrested for that crime. But the number of drunk
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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driving arrests alone does not indicate the rate of enforcement, what is
needed in addition is the ratio of arrests to the total number of persons
committing the crime of driving while intoxicated. Arrest figures are available, but as indicated above, they are not entirely reliable. Furthermore,
there are stops made by police which do not show up in the arrest figures.
These "stops short of arrest" may be interpreted as a means of enforcing
the drunk-driving laws by warning individuals rather than arresting and
prosecuting them. As a measure of enforcement, the arrest figures do not
reflect "guilty" drivers who were merely warned, but do include a number
of "innocent" drivers who were arrested but who should not have been.
The number of persons who drive while intoxicated is not known. However, comparing drunk-driving arrests with other measures gives some indication of the rate of enforcement if these other measures vary with the
amount of drunk driving. For example, population could be one such variable. In the four years, 1964 through 1967, the Kansas City police arrested
well over twice the number of drivers as did the St. Louis police. Yet,
the population of Kansas City (475,539 by the 1960 census) is a little more
than half (63%1) of the population of St. Louis (750,026 by the 1960 census). Adjusting drunk-driving arrests by population shows an arrest rate
in Kansas City that is 4.71 times the drunk-driving arrest rate in St. Louis.
Drunk-driving Arrests per 1000 Population
St. Louis
1964
1965
1966
1967
Average

Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

1.09
1.20
1.23
0.92

5.94
4.70
4.92
5.38

5.45
3.92
4.00
5.85

1.21

5.23

4.71

Since these ratios are based on the 1960 census figures, and do not
take into account any changes in population during the period, they do not
accurately reflect changes in enforcement for the four-year period.
A comparison of arrests with the automobile population of the two
cities shows an even greater disparity in arrests. The automobile population
of St. Louis is more than twice that of Kansas City.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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Passenger Cars in Operation as of July 1*
St. Louis

1964
1965
1966

Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

204,015
0.453
450,512
0.454
225,127
495,884
230,665
0.459
502,275
(*Automobile population figures supplied by R. H. Polk & Co.,
Detroit, Michigan)
Drunk-driving Arrests per 1000 Passenger Cars
Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

1.82.
1.81
1.84

.13.26
9.94
10.15

7.61
5.49
5.52

1.82

1132

6.22

St. Louis
1964
'1965
1966
Average

On this basis the arrest rate in Kansas City is 6.22 times that in St. Louis.
The reliability of these figures as an indication of the enforcement rate
in the two cities depends upon the assumption that drunk driving varies
directly in proportion to population of people and cars. It may well be that
the driving (and drinking) habits are different in Kansas City and St.
Louis. Driving conditions in the two cities are quite different. St. Louis is a
compact city with a high density population;. Kansas City has its highly
populated areas and its areas of congested traffic, but compared to St.
Louis it is a sprawling city, encompassing in its boundaries areas that would
be considered suburbs in St. Louis. St. Louis is hemmed in on the east by
the Mississippi River and the state boundary and on the other three sides
by St. Louis County and has not been able to expand and incorporate
surrounding areas as has Kansas City. Comparing arrests per square mile
results in St. Louis having a higher arrest rate for drunk driving than Kansas
City, with the arrest rate in Kansas City being slightly more than half that
of St. Louis (0.576).
Arrests for Drunk Driving per Square Mile
St. Louis
Kansas City
(61 Sq. Mi.)
(316 Sq. Mi.)
1964
1965
1966
1967
Average

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

13.43
14.73
15.16
•11.36

8.95
7.08
7.41
8.10

0.666
0.481
0A89
0.713

13.67

7.88

0.576
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While .these comparisons of arrests with population and area give some
indication of the enforcement rate, they are clearly insufficient for anything
but generalizations.
At the beginning of this study it was hoped that use of the number of
accidents which involved drinking would provide an indicator of the amount
of drunk driving. The assumption was that the police report of accidents
would not be as dependent upon police discretion as arrests. The accident
form used by both St. Louis and Kansas City police contains an entry for
"contributing circumstances," which includes "had been drinking." However, it soon became clear that this entry was worthless as an indicator of
how many accidents involved a drinking driver.
'The figures for St. Louis indicated that drinking was involved in only
2.52% of all automobile accidents, and there was very little difference
throughout the period being studied. Kansas City showed a slightly different pattern with drinking involved in 3.57% of the accidents, with a low
of 2.35% in 1966 and a high of 4.85% in 1964. If these figures were correct,
it would mean that drinking was not very seriously connected with automobile accidents in St. Louis and Kansas City, a conclusion that is contrary
to expectations and common sense. 'Investigation showed that the entry
"had been drinking" acquired a special meaning for the police in filling out
accident forms. In St. Louis the officers were instructed that, if they checked
"had been drinking" as a contributing circumstance in the accident, then
they should charge the driver with a drunk-driving offense. The entry "had
been drinking" is not a description of a circumstance surrounding the accident but rather an indication that the officer will charge the driver with
drunk driving.
The Kansas City figures show a slightly different pattern. In 1964, according to police records, 4.85% of all accidents involved drinking; that
is, the entry "had been drinking" was checked. In 1965 this fell to 2.63%,
not because of any improvement in the driving habits in Kansas City, but
because the police adopted the policy of not checking "had been drinking"
unless they were going to charge the driver with drunk driving. In 1964,
when the "had been drinking" entry could be made without a decision to
charge the driver with drunk driving, there was no consistent policy in
making the entry, and, although the number of such entries is higher in
1964, there is no reason to believe it is an accurate indication of the number of accidents which involved drinking.
Other possible ways to indicate the degree of enforcement are to comPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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pare drunk arrests with accident figures and traffic fatalities. Comparing
arrests with accidents shows as follows:
Arrests per 100 Accidents

St. Louis

Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

1964
1965
1966
1967

4.35
4.32
4.33
3.00

13.32
9.87
10.13
11.81

3.06
2.28
2.34
3.94

1967
1966
1964
1965

All Years Avera ge 3.97

11.24

2.83

On this basis, the arrest rate in Kansas City is 2.83 times that of St. Louis.
It is logical to assume that drunk driving would be involved to a higher
degree in single car accidents than in all accidents. Comparing arrests to
single car accidents show the following:
Arrests per 10 Single Car Accidents
(Does not include collision with parked car)
Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

4.42
4.58
4.26
2.88

14.75
10.73
9.87
11.54

3.34
2.34
2.32
4.01

3.97

11.60

2.92

St. Louis
1964
1965
1966
1967
All Years Average

By this comparison, the arrest rate for drunk driving in single car accidents in Kansas City is 2.92 times that of St. Louis.
Using fatalities as the measure of enforcement, the results are:
Arrests per Automobile Accident Fatality
(Number of Fatalities in Parentheses)
St. Louis
1964
1965
1966
1967

(86)
(107)
(93)
(106)

Total

9.52
8.39
9.95
6.54
8.51

Kansas City
(88)
(68)
(108)
(86)

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

32.12
32.90
21.68
29.77

3.37
3.92
2.18
4.55

28.47

3.35

Using this standard, the Kansas City enforcement rate is 3.35 times that of
St. Louis.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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However, as indicated earlier, the traffic conditions are different in St.
Louis from those in Kansas City and, as might be expected, St. Louis has
a larger percentage of pedestrian fatalities than Kansas City. When pedestrian fatalities are removed from the total number of fatalities, the resuits are:
Arrests per Nonpedestrian Automobile Fatality
(Number of Fatalities in Parentheses)
Ratio
K.C./St.L.
Kansas City
St. Louis
1964
1965
1966
1967

(44)
(53)
(57)
(47)
Total

18.61
16.94
16.23
14.74
16.59

(71)
(50)
(82)
(64)

39.82
44.74
28.55
40.00

2.14
2.64
1.76
2.71

37.32

2.25

With the fatality figures adjusted to remove pedestrian fatalities, the Kansas City enforcement rate is 2.25 times that of St. Louis.
Since there is no precise measure of the amount of drunk driving that
takes place, the use of other measures to combine with the drunk arrest
figures can only give a rough indication of the enforcement rate. However,
the figures do indicate that Kansas City has a higher enforcement rate than
St. Louis. Using the criteria of population, area, automobile population,
accidents, single car accidents, traffic fatalities, and nonpedestrian fatalities,
the results show that, in every instance except that of area, Kansas City's
arrest rate is at least twice as high as St. Louis.
The classification of Kansas City as an area of "high enforcement" or
"aggressive enforcement" and St. Louis as an area of "low enforcement" or
"conservative enforcement" is not meant as either praise or criticism. While
there are certain factors which may encourage Kansas City police to arrest
and discourage police from arresting in St. Louis, the difference may be just
the choice of application of manpower to traffic control or to other police
ends (control of "crime in the streets," improving relations with minority
groups, etc.).
B. Tke Measure of Degree of Police Enforcement
We have discussed the criteria that can be used to determine the degree
of police enforcement and the reliability of those measures. With the exception of the population, area, and automobile population figures, all are
dependent upon police reporting and record-keeping procedures. The probPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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lem of arrest figures has already been "discussed. The St.*Louis figures, it is
believed, have been corrected and accurately reflect the arrests as reported
by the individual police. The Kansas City figures have not been corrected,
and it is believed in particular the 1964 figures may not be accurate.
The problem presented by accident statistics is different. The police do
not have the same discretion in making an accident report as they do with
making an arrest. They may stop and warn a motorist and never report the
incident as an arrest. If they are called to investigate an accident, they are
supposed to (and usually do) make an accident report. The number of accidents reported is probably an accurate figure. However, the details of the
accident which are entered upon the accident report form may not be
accurate, as in the case of the entry "had been drinking." This information
could be very valuable in estimating the amount of drunk driving as well as
the effectiveness of any campaign to control drunk driving. But to be
accurate, that is, to reflect the policeman's judgment as to whether or not
there was drinking involved, the police must be forced to make an entry
concerning drinking for every accident. As long as the policernan.has a choice
whether to enter "had been drinking" or making no entry, the "no entry"
will include instances where the officer believed drinking was involved. And,
as happened in both St. Louis and Kansas City, when the entry "had been
drinking" acquires a special meaning of "will charge with drunk driving,"
the no entry will include even more cases where the officer believes drinking
was involved.
The Missouri Highway Patrol accident report has a category "Driver's
Condition-Drinking" and requires an entry to indicate:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Had not been drinking
Had been drinking-obviously drunk
Same-ability impaired
Same-ability not impaired
Same-not known whether impaired

Their records for the period 1964 through 1967 indicated that accidents involving drinking to some degree ranged from 13.75% to 15.36%o. This entry
is dependent upon the officer's judgment and may not be an accurate measure of the amount of accidents involving drinking, but it does indicate that
the St. Louis and Kansas City accident reports grossly under-report the
number of accidents in which drinking is involved.
The figures showing the total number of accidents are taken from comhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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puterized police statistics of their monthly reports. It is believed that these
figures accurately reflect the number of accidents investigated by the police.
The figures showing single car accidents are not as reliable. These figures
were obtained from the accident report entries entitled, "Collision of Motor
Vehicle with . . . fixed object, other object, overturned, ran off road, and

other non-collision." These figures do not include collision with a parked
car, since there was no such entry on the St. Louis accident form. Although
the "single car accident" figure is some indication of single car accidents, it
does not reflect all accidents in which only one driver was involved.
The fatality figures are reliable to a point. There is no doubt that the
record of fatalities is an important one, and the significance of the event
is an incentive for the police to keep accurate records. However, for any
period there is a problem of adjustment to cover persons who die several
months after an accident. The fatality figures for any period may be short
these "late deaths." Usually the "late" fatalities are picked up and yearly
records corrected to reflect them; however, in some instances the monthly
totals do not reflect them.
The basic difficulty with any measure of enforcement is that there is no
way of knowing how many drivers are driving while intoxicated, and without this information a precise measure of enforcement is not possible. We
can but use the measures available and estimate the effects of the implied
consent law.
C. Changes in tlhe Degree of Enforcement
St. Louis. The raw number of arrests in this city following the effective
date (January 1966) of implied consent indicates the possibility of a slight
increase in arrests immediately following the passage of the law but shows
a tapering-off soon after to an arrest total similar to the period before the
law. (See Table III.) In 1964, the monthly average of arrests was 68.25; in
1965, this rose to 74.08; and in 1966 (after implied consent), it increased to
77.08. However, during the first four months after the implied consent law
became effective in St. Louis, the average monthly arrests totaled 85.75. In
the next 13 months (May 1966 through May 1967) the monthly average
was 73.46. In June 1967, there was a sharp drop in arrests, and this continued throughout the remainder of that year. For the last seven months
of 1967 the arrests averaged only 45.7 per month. Whatever the reasons for
this sudden drop, it was not likely that they had any connection with the
implied consent law. In any event, the only immediate effect of the implied
consent law was the slight increase in the number of arrests immediately
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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after its enactment, but this was not necessarily due to the passage of the
implied consent law. The last four months of 1965 also showed an increase
in drunk arrests as compared with the preceding years, and the monthly
arrest average for the last four months of 1965 was slightly higher than
the first four months of 1966 (87.25 to 85.75).
Moreover, changes in the number of arrests would not necessarily
indicate any change in the degree of enforcement. Comparing arrests with
other measures gives a better picture of any change in the degree of enforcement. Since the population and area figures used to illustrate the different
enforcement patterns in St. Louis and Kansas City were the same for all
years being studied, a comparison of arrests by years to those other
measures would show the same changes as in the number of arrests.
Comparing arrests with automobile population shows very little change
in the arrest rate. In the two years before the implied consent law, St. Louis
had an average of 1.82 arrests per 1000 passenger cars with no difference by
year. The year after implied consent, this rate was 1.84. Both the number of
automobiles and the number of arrests increased in the period from 1964
to 1966, but the ratio of the two remained almost constant.
The number of arrests in the first four months after the implied consent law indicate a possible increase immediately after the law became
effective. There were more arrests in the January-April period of 1966 than
in any of the other years. However, a comparison of arrests with the automobile population indicates the change was slight.
St. Louis
1964
1965
1966
1967

No. of Arrests

Jan.-April
317
Jan.-April
262
Jan.-April
343
Jan-April
292
*Based on July 1, 1966 automobile population.

Arrests per 1000 Cars
.7036
.5283
.6829
.5813*

While the arrest rate per automobile population was higher during this period of 1966 than in the preceding or subsequent year, the arrest rate for
1964 was slightly higher indicating that changes in arrest rate may have
been due to something other than the implied consent law.
The ratio of arrests to accidents and single car accidents provides a
method of estimating changes in the enforcement rate on a monthly basis.
This ratio is shown in Table VI and in Chart A. This ratio showed an increase in enforcement after January 1966, followed by a drop to a level
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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similar to most of 1964 and 1965, and then a very sharp drop in June 1967
and. a low level of enforcement for the remainder of 1967.
The changes in the number of arrests and the ratio of arrests to other
measures are undoubtedly due to a number of causes. It is reasonable to
assume the implied consent law is related to the increase in enforcement
after that law became effective, even though that increase also appears to
be a continuation of a trend of increased enforcement beginning in mid-tolate 1965. However, whatever effect the implied consent law had on the
enforcement rate, it was not a lasting effect, as the enforcement rate dropped
to pre-implied consent levels and further. There is no reason to believe the
implied consent law resulted in a drop in the enforcement rate. This drop,
as was stated before, is due to other causes.
TABLE

VI

Arrests per 100 Reported Accidents
St. louis
V

14

A

it

I

j

A

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

3.91

4.35

4.08 4.63 5.18

4.24 4.57 4.79

4.32

3.42

4.66

3.78

4.33

4.51 4.53 4.23 3.60 3.70 2.19 2.56 2.50 1.96 2.06 2.02 2.71

3.00

1964

6.42

6.54 4.77 4.89

4.96 2.86 3.88

1965

4.42

3.92 3.95

4.50

3.48

3.98

1966

4.59

6.28 5.22

5.00

3.72

3.60

1967

3.76 3.61 4.45 2.99
3.89 3.83

4.35

Arrests per 10 Sirgle CarAccidents
1964

6.03

6.20

5.18

St. louis
4.44 4.76 2.59 4.28

3.24

4.52

5.18

3.31 4.17

4.42

1965

4.17

4.42

3.82

4.76 3.67

4.77

3.95

5.42

5.67

4.38

4.50 5.50

4.58

1966

4.23

7.18

5.73

4.78

4.07

3.88

3.74 3.72

3.33

4.13 4.26

1967

3.93

3.53

3.42

4.22

3.43 2.33 2.41 2.64

3.44

4.26

1.96 2.22 2.17 2.34

2.88

A comparison of arrests for drunk driving with automobile accident
fatalities shows a similar pattern but with greater month-to-month variation.
(See Chart B) While automobile accident fatalities may have a closer relation to drunk driving than any other accident statistic, the small number of
fatalities per month makes useful comparison difficult. 15 A change in the
number of fatalities can be due to a number of factors other than to a reduction in the amount of drunk driving. A single multiple death accident
can result in doubling the fatalities for a given month, and conversely the
15. See Haddon and Bradess, Alcohol in the Single Vehicle Fatal Accident,
Experience of Westchester Comty, New York, reprinted in HADDON, SUCHMAN AND
KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARCH (1964).
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proper use of first aid may save lives that would have been lost. Any change
in the monthly death figures produces a great distortion because of the
small number involved.
Kansas City. The effective date of the implied consent law in Kansas
City was the middle of October 1965. The available records are kept on a
monthly basis and that particular month will be considered as the first
month after the implied consent law became operative in Kansas City.
The raw arrest totals for Kansas City indicate little change after the
implied consent law. (See Table IV.) In the 21 months preceding the law,
the Kansas City police averaged 204.5 arrests per month; in the 27 months
after the law, the average was 210.0.
The arrest figures from Kansas City are of much more doubtful accuracy
than those obtained from St. Louis. The December 1964 total was grossly
overstated, and it is possible the figures for that entire year are inaccurate.
The figures for December 1965 appeared abnormally high and may also have
been the result of poor computer work. Comparisons on a monthly basis
for the year 1964 are not accurate as the monthly totals are admitted by the
Kansas City police to be incorrect.
The rate of arrest compared to automobile population showed a rate of
13.86 arrests per 1000 cars in 1964; 9.937 arrests per 1000 cars in 1965; and
10.149 arrests per 1000 cars in 1966.
No valid comparison could be made for the months immediately following the effective date of the implied consent law because of the inaccuracy
of the December 1964 arrest figures. A comparison of the arrest rate of the
first four months of 1964 and 1965 showed an arrest rate per 1000 cars of
3.64 in 1964 and 2.69 in 1965 (both years before the implied consent law).
In 1966 the rate rose to 3.49, an increase over 1965 but not as high as 1964,
indicating that, as in St. Louis, the changes in enforcement may have been
dependent on causes other than the implied consent law.
Comparing arrests to accidents on a monthly basis in Kansas City (see
Table VII and Chart C) showed that 1964 (the year of admittedly inaccurate monthly totals) was a year of high enforcement, followed by a drop
in 1965 and a rise in late 1965 that continued through 1967 with, however,
substantial monthly variations. It is interesting to note that when compared
to St. Louis (see Chart A) the arrests per 100 accidents were not only much
higher in Kansas City, but the monthly variations were more extreme in
Kansas City.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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TABIE VIZ
Arrests per 100 Accidents
Kansas City
J

V

M!

A

M

J

j

A

S

0

N

D

9.67 13.84 11.28 28.96

TOTAL
13.32

4.95

6.57 13.58 20.43 9.01 14.73 11.74 10.82

1965

5.20

8.91 7.18 12.41 8.13 8.79 10.26

7.16 12.30

9.78

8.26 18.37

1966

13.26

7.51 9.09

7.25 11.23

2.38

9.38 12.20 10.13

1967

14.56 16.53 17.27 1227 11.80 9.77

1964

8.28 11.50 10.32 9.61

9.86

9.77

9.57

9.08 12.10 12.29

9.87
11.81

Arrests per 10 Single Car Accidents (Excluding Collision with Parked Car)
Kansas City
6.52 13.73 18.92

1964

5.26

1965

4.85 10.88

1966 13.97
1967

8.92

8.91 15.44 13.14 10.54 11.17 15.09

9.86 29.91

14.75

7.20 14.83 11.04

8.90 19.19

10.73

7.83

9.23 12.83

9.87

8.63 11.89 10.90

11.54

7.26 13.04 8.38 10.65 12.78
9.76

9.55

9.53 7.71

14.01 16.57 17.01 13.84 12.35 10.00

7.61

9.02 9.06

9.67 12.95
9.54

Chart D shows the monthly variation comparing arrests to single car
accidents. The single car accident figure is not the same as the one used
in the St. Louis chart nor that used in comparing enforcement rates between
the two cities. For although the Kansas City entry, "collision with parked
car," was excluded (as the St. Louis reports have no such entry) those
accidents apparently were entered under "collision with other motor vehicle."
Table VII shows the Kansas City figures on single car accidents but excludes
collisions with parked cars. The inclusion of this category can be seen in
Chart D.
The comparison of arrests to single car accidents (Chart D) showed a
pattern similar to the monthly ratio of arrests to accidents. However, comparing arrests with fatalities on a monthly basis showed a slightly different
pattern with a declining enforcement rate in 1965 and 1966 followed by an
increase in 1967. However, as noted, fatality figures are small, and slight
changes in the number of fatalities can produce large distortion. (See
Chart E.)
In Kansas City, as in St. Louis, there were changes indicated in the
enforcement rate during the four-year period. However, except for a possible
increase immediately after the implied consent law became operative, there
was nothing to indicate a lasting change in enforcement that could be attributed to the implied consent law. Kansas City's rate of enforcement was
high compared to St. Louis both before and after the law. Thus in both
cities, the implied consent law greatly increased the numbers of tests given
but did not seem to have had an appreciable effect upon the degree of
enforcement of the drunk-driving laws.
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So far in this study, it has been emphasized that Kansas City is an
area of high enforcement and St. Louis an area of low enforcement. These
attributions are based on a comparison of the number of arrests for drunk
driving in the two cities and the comparison of the ratio of arrests to various
factors (population, area, automobile population, accidents, single car accidents, and fatalities) which are assumed to have a relationship to drunk
driving. It has been noted that driving conditions in Kansas City are quite
different from those in St. Louis. Since the enforcement figures are of necessity dependent upon the arrest figures, Kansas City's high enforcement rate
may to some extent result from there being more drunks to arrest in Kansas
City than in St. Louis.
A comparison of the statistics of the two cities reveals that despite
substantial differences in size and population, the traffic figures are comparable on a one-to-one basis.
Ratio
St. Louis
Kansas City
K.C./St.L.
Population
750,026
475,539
0.634
Auto Population
1964
450,512
204,015
0.453
1965
495,884
225,127
0.454
1966
502,275
230,665
0.459
Area
61 Sq. Mi.
316 Sq. Mi.
5.180
Accidents
1964
18,833
1965
20,793
1966
21,346
1967
23,084
Single Car Accidents
(excluding collision
w/parked car)
1964
1,853
1965
1,961
1966
2,170
1967
2,408
Percent Accidents which are
Single Car Accidents
(excluding collision
w/parked car)
1964
9.83
1965
9.43
1966
10.16
1967
10.43

21,215
22,663
23,102
21,670

1.126
1.090
1.082
0.939

1,917
2,085
2,371
2,218

1.034
1.063
1.093
0.921

9.03
9.20
10.26
10.23
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1964
1965
1966
1967
Non-pedestrian Fatalities
1964
1965
1966
1967

[Vol. 33

86
107
93
106

88
68
108
86

1.023
0.635
1.161
0.811

44
53
57
47

71
50
82
64

1.614
0.943
1.438
1.362

If the accidents are recorded according to time of occurrence, there is a
difference in the nighttime accident figures for St. Louis and Kansas City.
Considering accidents which occur between 9:00 p.m. and 4:59 a.m. as
nighttime accidents, St. Louis has a greater number and a higher percentage
than Kansas City.
Ratio
K.C./St.L.
Kansas City
St. Louis
Nighttime Accidents
1964
1965
1966
1967

5,116
5,449
5,602
6,356

4,277
4,578
4,674
4,292

0.836
0.840
0.834
0.675

Percent of accidents which are nighttime accidents
20.16
1964
27.17
26.21
20.20
1965
20.23
26.25
1966
19.81
27.53
1967
This may indicate that while there is an equality of accidents (in
absolute numbers) the distribution of accidents as to day and night is
different. Kansas City may have a lower absolute incidence of miles of
drunk driving than St. Louis because night driving and night accidents are more commonly associated with drunk driving than is the pattern
of daytime driving and accidents. However arrests for drunk driving
show the Kansas City police to be far more active.
Drunk Driving Arrests

1964
1965
1966
1967

St. Louis

Kansas City

Ratio
K.C./St.L.

819
898
925
683

2,827
2,237
2,341
2,560

3.452
2.490
2.531
3.694
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A comparison of those who took the test and measured 0.15%o or
higher (presumption of intoxication) with those who measures 0.05%o-0.14%o
(presumption of sobriety) shows the Kansas City police arrest more
drinking drivers than do the St. Louis police.
Ratio
St. Louis
Kansas City
K.C./St.L.
0.15%o and higher
1966
1967 (Jan.-May)

532
205

1,261
636

2.37
3.10

0.05o -0.14o
1966
1967 (Jan.-May)

13
6

481
254

37.00
42.33

0.00-0.04%
1966
1967 (Jan-May)

4
2

56
54

14.00
27.00

It was indicated earlier that the St. Louis police were highly selective
in their arrests for drunk driving, arresting only those persons who were
obviously drunk. However, the Kansas City police were arresting a greater
number of drunk persons, including those who had been drinking enough
to impair their driving ability but were not yet in the "0.15% and higher"
category.
A further indication that the figures for St. Louis deal with a select
group of drunk drivers was shown by the test results during the period
after the implied consent law became operative-January through April
196 6-a period of increased arrests, and inferentially of increased police
activity, in enforcing the drunk-driving laws. During this period 207
arrested drivers measured out at 0.15% or higher, while only 4 measured
between 0.05-0.14%, and there was none in the category of 0.049 and below.
(During the same period in Kansas City, 447 drivers tested out at 0.15yo
and higher, 177 at 0.05 %-0.14% and 22 at 0.04% and below.) Thus, even
with increased enforcement St. Louis still arrested only the very drunk,
leading to the conclusion that there were many drivers who had been
drinking but were untouched, or at least not arrested, by the police.
As mentioned, although Kansas City and St. Louis have differing enforcement systems, adoption of the implied consent law had quite similar
effects in both systems. In both, the police began to test more and the
number of persons submitting to testing rose sharply. However, except for
a slight increase in activity immediately after the effective date of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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'implied consent law, both systems showed little long-run enforcement
change that could be attributed to the implied consent law. The St.
Louis pattern of enforcement from January 1966 through May 1967 was
just about the same as before implied consent. From June through December 1967, the St. Louis enforcement rate dropped to a low level. Thus, St.
Louis, originally a city of low enforcement remained a city of low enforcement and even became lower, while Kansas City, originally a city of high
enforcement, remained a city of high enforcement.
D. Reasons for the Lack of Change
However, some increase in enforcement would be anticipated with
the adoption of an implied consent law as the law gives the police a weapon
to facilitate the processing of drunk-driving cases since convincing evidence
of guilt is easier to obtain. This, logically, would provide an incentive
for the police to be more aggressive in enforcing drunk-driving laws, yet
in St. Louis we have seen that the pattern of enforcement did not change.
This could be due to a choice to use police resources toward ends other than
traffic control. Or it could be that when the centralized testing system,
which discourages aggressive police action in enforcement of drunk-driving
laws, is coupled with the attitudes and practices of the St. Louis prosecuting attorneys, they combine to create a dampening effect on aggressive
police enforcement.
Before a change in spring of 1966, almost all prosecutions for drunk
driving in St. Louis were brought by the city attorney who would charge
a violation of the city ordinance. As a result of pressures, including pressure from newspapers, the circuit attorney began prosecuting some drunkdriving cases under the state law. In order to bring a case to court under
state law, the arresting officer must present his evidence (including the
breath test results) to the circuit attorney's office which then decides
whether or not "to issue the warrant," that is, to proceed with the prosecution. If that office refuses then the officer presents the case to the city
attorney's office which decides whether or not to prosecute. The circuit
attorney's office normally will not prosecute if the test shows less than
0.15%y, and is especially reluctant to prosecute if no test has been given,
although if the evidence of intoxication is very good the office may prosecute
without test results. The city attorney's office is similarly reluctant to
prosecute if the test shows less than 0.15%, but is not as reluctant if no
test was given. For prosecution the test must show 0.15%o' or higher, which
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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makes the St. Louis police reluctant to bring in any person for testing
who will not, in the officer's opinion, test out at that level. Bringing in a
xlriver who tests under 0.15%o 'is discouraged both by the attitudes of
the prosecuting offices and by the police themselves who are naturally
interested in maintaining a "good record."
The remarkable drop in enforcement in St. Louis during the last
,half of 1967 is difficult to explain. The figures showing this drop were not
.obtained until late 1968,- and there has been no thorough attempt to
investigate the possible causes. One report was that the city prosecutor's
office adopted the system of refusing to "issue the warrant" unless the
individual arrested was still in custody. In many drunk-driving -cases the
warrant is not sought until the day after the arrest (the arrest having
occurred at night) and by that time most drivers have obtained their
release on bond. The net effect of such a policy would be to prevent a majority of prosecutions by the city prosecutor.
It is difficult to explain why the city prosecutor should have adopted
such a policy (if, in fact, he has). If it is true, it could certainly discourage
the police from making drunk-driving arrests as it would greatly increase
the chance that the arrest would not result in a conviction. In any event,
no matter what the causes, the enforcement of the drunk driving laws in
St. Louis has fallen from its low level to practically no enforcement at all.
In Kansas. City; as noted previously, the police have more control
over the enforcement of the drunk-driving laws. In Kansas City, the
test presumably provided additional encouragement for the police to arrest
suspected drunk drivers, but did not substantially increase the degree of
enforcement which was comparatively high even before the implied consent
law.
E. Evaluation
'Evaluation of the two enforcement systems and the implied consent
law depends up.on the values one wishes to emphasize. Success is a matter
of definition. Kansas City police arrest more drunk drivers than do the
St. Louis police. They arrest a greater percentage of the drunk-driving
population than do the St. Louis police, which includes more "innocent"
persons, i.e., those who test out to less than 0.05% on the intoximeter.
Yet even in Kansas City, the number of "innocents" is relatively small
when compared to the total number arrested. The inconvenience to these
persons is a cost to be measured against the benefits of the system. However, being arrested and "passing" the test may indeed yield benefits to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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the enforcement system since the person arrested, despite the inconvenience
of his arrest, has learned that the system is fair due to the test, and that
there is enforcement of the drunk-driving laws, which might deter him in
the future from driving while intoxicated.
If strict enforcement of the drunk-driving laws is the aim, then the
Kansas City system is better. If inconvenience to the general driving
population is to be avoided, even at the low levels noted in Kansas City,
then the St. Louis system certainly rates higher. The implied consent law,
while increasing efficiency in handling drunk-driving cases, does not of
itself seem to have a substantial effect on the degree of enforcement of
drunk-driving laws.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLIED CONSENT ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF DRUNK-DRIVING CONTROLS
A. Revocations
The drunk arrest, discussed previously, is the beginning of a multifaceted process involving consent or refusal to submit to a test and
determinations by the officer, the prosecuting attorney, and a criminal
court. We now turn to a consideration of the effects of implied consent on
these processes.
Loss of operator's license through suspension or revocation was possible
prior to (and after) the implied consent law. Courts, including municipal
courts, are required by statute to report to the Department of Revenue
in Jefferson City any convictions for violation of traffic laws. This includes,
of course, drunk driving. The Department of Revenue assesses the prescribed
number of points against the offending driver and upon the accumulation
of sufficient points in a certain period of time, the offending driver's operator's license may be suspended or revoked. A conviction of drunk driving
in violation of the state law carries 12 points, enough by itself for revocation for one year. When such a conviction occurs, the judge of the court
is required to collect the operator's license from the driver and send it
to the Department of Revenue. A conviction of drunk driving in violation
of city ordinance carries only 6 points and cannot, of itself, result in suspension or revocation of the license, although the license may be lost if
the driver has accumulated sufficient points from other violations. A municipal court (city traffic court) cannot revoke a driver's license.'
16. § 302.225, RSMo 1967 Supp.
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With the enactment of the implied consent law, a new method of
revocation was established: revocation for refusal to submit to the chemical

test. This revocation is not based upon any adjudication of guilt, but
simply upon the refusal to comply to a valid request. Table V indicates
the number of revocations in the two cities for refusal to consent to the
test. Revocation figures were obtained from the Department of Revenue
in Jefferson City. They depend, of course, upon the police sending in the
notice of refusal. From discussions with several police officers, it was found
that they thought refusals were sent in in nearly every instance; so the
figures in the Department of Revenue are probably valid. Statistics relating
the number of tests given and the number of refusals forwarded give no
indication of a large number of "missing refusals" when compared to the
gross number of arrests.
If most refusals are reported to Jefferson City, then a comparison
can be made with the number of tests actually given. A comparison of
refusals with the number of persons arrested is not as reliable because of
the doubtful accuracy of the arrest figures, particularly those from Kansas
City. For example, from January 1966 through May 1967 there were
(according to police records) 1,298 arrests in St. Louis, 773 tests given,
and 445 refusals. Of the 1,298 arrests, all but 80 are accounted for as
having been tested or as having refused.
On the other hand, in Kansas City during the same period there were
3,496 arrests, 2,767 tests given, and 1,063 refusals. This means that there were
334 more tests and refusals than there were persons arrested. It is believed
that this discrepancy is due to persons being technically arrested in Kansas
City but being released before being entered officially as an arrest.
A comparison of the number of refusals with the number of tests
does, nevertheless, give some indication of the refusal rate and the differences in the two cities. Taking the number of tests given plus the number
of refusals as being the population that is requested to submit to the test,
the percentage of refusals is higher in St. Louis than in Kansas City, St.
Louis recording 37.1%o refusals to 27.9% for Kansas City. (See Chart F.)
No percentage is shown for St. Louis until January 1966 when the implied
consent law became effective there. The refusal rate for that month is low
(27.9%o) because the police did not have an approved testing machine
during the entire month, and, until the approved machine was acquired, no
refusals were reported.17 Kansas City also shows a low rate of refusals
17. One refusal was reported in December 1965. However, the license was
reinstated.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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(22.4%5) during its first month, October 1965, under the implied consent
law. However, the law was not in effect during that entire month so
refusals could be reported only after the law became effective on October
13. In addition to having a lower rate of refusals, Kansas City's refusal
rate is fairly constant, and there is even a slight decline in the refusal
rate. St. Louis, on the other hand, shows considerable variation in the
refusal rate from month to month. This variation is due in part to the
small number of tests and refusals compared to Kansas City so that a
slight change in number can result in a large percentage change. In addition, the pattern in St. Louis shows a general increase in the refusal rate.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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Thus, while Kansas City has a far greater number of persons who lost
their driving privileges than St. Louis, a greater percentage of those requested to take the test refused in St. Louis than in Kansas City.
The difference in refusal rate may be related to the differences in
the groups arrested in the two cities. In St. Louis, judging from the results
of the tests administered, only those drivers who are presumed to test out
at least 0.157 are arrested. In Kansas City, a much larger percentage
of persons is arrested, and many test out at less than 0.15%. It is reasonable
to believe that refusals would be greater among the very drunk than among
those who had simply been drinking. If fear of failing the test causes
persons to be reluctant to take the test, then one would find a greater
number of refusals among the drunk. However, while this might account
for the difference in refusal rates between the two cities, it does not explain
the apparent increase in the refusal rate in St. Louis.
If the objective of the implied consent law is to provide a deterrent
to drunk driving, the loss of the driver's license would seem to be a significant deterrent. 'In individual cases the loss of the license for a year makes
it less likely that the individual will drive (and will drive drunk) during
that period. To the extent that it imposes a punishment, the revocation may
serve the same purpose and perhaps serve it better as a conviction. To
most people the loss of a driver's license is a greater penalty than the
usual fine ($100 to $125) imposed for a conviction of drunk driving. If
the conviction also results in the loss of the driver's license (under the
point system), then the penalty for refusal to take the test is less than
the penalty for failure. However, refusing to take the test does not simply
result in revocation of a driver's license. The individual can still be
prosecuted either for drunk driving or for some other but lesser violation
such as careless and reckless driving.
The main advantage to the system of revocation for refusal to submit
to the test as a way to getting drivers off the road is administrative convenience; adjudication is not required. This convenience may not be costless.
The implied consent law is basically a form of compulsory disclosure or
supplying of incriminating evidence. The compulsion is the threat of loss
of the driver's license for refusal to supply the evidence. Although the law
is clear that this does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination,
there is a question of basic fairness involved in any system of compulsory
disclosure or punishment. However, with the implied consent law the individual himself makes the choice, albeit possibly between unpleasant alternatives, and he has been placed in this situation because of conspicuously
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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irresponsible behavior or at least behavior which gives an officer reasonable
ground to believe he is driving while intoxicated. The use of implied consent
seems fairer than other forms of official intervention, such as tests without
consent, which are theoretically permissible under Schmerber, and seems
preferable to the alternative of not allowing any tests without consent
and providing no penalty for refusal. Revocation for refusal to take the
test may in a given case be a harsh result, but it is preferable to the
available alternatives.
Some of the harshness of the implied consent law is alleviated by
the provisions for allowing reinstatement of driver's licenses and for the
issuance of hardship licenses. Upon the request of the person whose license
has been revoked for refusal to submit to the test, a hearing will be held
before a court as to whether the revocation was proper. However, the hearings are limited to:
1. whether or not the person was arrested;
2. whether or not the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to
believe the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition; and,
3. whether or not the person refused to submit to the test.18
If any of these issues are found in favor of the driver, the court then
orders the license to be reinstated. It is also possible for a court to issue
a hardship license with limited driving privileges where "a driver is required to operate a motor vehicle in connection with his business, occupation
or employment."'19
During the period of October 1965 through May 1967, there were the
following number of reinstatements and hardship licenses issued after
revocation for refusal to submit to the test.
St. Louis
Refusal revocations

456 100%

Kansas City
1,216 100%

Rest of State
1,141

100%5

Petitions for
Reinstatement

28

6.14

292

24.01

375

26.52

Reinstatement Orders

13

2.85

145

11.92

118

8.34

Hardship Licenses
Issued

13

2.85

51

4.19

119

8.41

18. § 564.444 RSMo 1967 Supp. It should be noted that this does not include
whether the required warning was given by the arresting officer.
19. § 302.309 RSMo 1965 Supp.
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This information was obtained by manual examination of the revocation files in the Department of Revenue in Jefferson City. The reasons
for the reinstatements are not known. However, the small number of
petitions in St. Louis as compared to Kansas City may indicate that the
St. Louis police make fewer mistakes in administering the implied consent
law than the Kansas City police. As mentioned above, the St. Louis
police arrest only the very drunk whereas the Kansas City police arrest a
sizable number who test out at less than the 0.15% level of intoxication.
The possibilities of making arrests without probable cause would be much
greater in an area of aggressive enforcement than in an area of conservative
enforcement, and this may account for the very small number of reinstatement applications and reinstatements in St. Louis. There are also rumors
that some judges in Kansas City (and in outstate Missouri), antagonistic
to the implied consent law, were more willing to grant reinstatements. In
any event, a driver who refuses to submit to the test and has his license
revoked has a much better chance for getting it reinstated in Kansas City
than he has in St. Louis, but reinstatements and hardship licenses even
in Kansas City, total only about 16% of the total number of revocations.
B. Convictions
One of the major purposes of the implied consent law is to compel
persons arrested for drunk driving to submit to the test and thus provide
convincing evidence of their intoxication. With this evidence, convictions
are supposed to be more certain in those cases where the test indicates
intoxication.
Under Missouri law all traffic convictions must be reported to the
Department of Revenue in Jefferson City so that the prescribed points
may be assessed against the offender. This report is to be made within ten
days of the conviction.20 Tables VIII and IX show the number of convictions for drunk driving reported to the department from St. Louis and
Kansas City. There is a delay between the arrest and the conviction and
possibly a further delay in reporting the conviction so that a comparison
of arrests with convictions will be affected by this lag. Similarly, comparison on a monthly basis will be affected since the arrests of one month
may not result in a conviction until a later month. On a yearly basis,
however, most of this lag will balance out.
20. § 302.225, RSMo 1959, § 302.225, RSMo 1965 Supp.
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TABLE VIII
hild Intoxicated Convictions Reported to Jefferson City

Driving

St. Louis

o

N

D

TOTAL

32

27

40

37

390
1

38

42

49

45
1

41

525
3

31
12

49
13

52
15

39
24

43
10

36
17

665
113

18
24

12
16

19
14

19
16

14
14

12
18

282
280

J

F

H

A

H

3

3

A

1964 Cit y
State

25

10

31

43
1

35

33

42

35

1965 Cit y
Sta te

42

36

49

37

47

52

47
2

1966 Cit y
Sta te

95

62

70

72
1

58
4

58
17

1967 Cit y
Sta to

40
28

29
33

33
33

29
28

33
28

24
28

TABLE IX
Driving While Intoxicated Convictions Reported to Jefferson City
Kansas CitY
H

3

A

1

J

3

A

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

101

1,194
1

78

1,159
2

91 119 127

112

113

93

102
1

90 103

100

117 106
1

93

82

95

106

99

118

114

100

103

130
1

92

112

72

113

107

80

1,257
1

145 104
1

135
1

114

109 117

81

94

107 105

93

104

1,308
2

1964 City
State

82

61

1965 City
State

106

94

1966 City
State

116

1967 City
State

83
1

St. Louis. A comparison of arrests to convictions shows the following
yearly conviction rate for St. Louis.

1964
1965
1966
1967

No. Arrests

Convictions
Reported

Percent
of Convictions

819
898
925
693

391
528
778
562

47.7
58.8
85.2
81.1

This would indicate that the conviction rate increased greatly after the
implied consent law became operative in January 1966, and remained
high despite the drop in arrests in 1967.
This, of course, depends upon the figures being accurate. The difficulty
in getting accurate arrest figures has already been discussed. The conviction figures were obtained from the Department of Revenue in Jefferson
City. That office supplied a print-out from their computer indicating all
convictions for drunk driving, and this print-out was manually checked
for St. Louis and Kansas City convictions. Again, the accuracy of the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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conviction figures depends upon the various courts reporting the convictions
to Jefferson City. A comparison with the records of the two city courts
in St. Louis discloses some discrepancies. The City Court's records show
605 convictions for driving while intoxicated during the year 1965, while
Jefferson City received reports of only 525 such convictions. Only three
state convictions were reported during the same year. In 1966 the City
Court records show 685 convictions, while there were 665 city convictions
reported to Jefferson City. This would indicate that the reporting of
convictions by the City Courts was good during 1966 but possibly not
so good in earlier years. If the City Court records are accurate, there was
still an increase in the percentage of arrests resulting in convictions after
the implied consent law, but the increase was not as great, rising from
slightly over 67o in 1965 to over 86y in 1966. There were 133 state convictions reported to Jefferson City in 1966 from St. Louis. Prior to May
1966, nearly all prosecutions for drunk driving in St. Louis were brought in
the City Court. After that date, partially as a result of pressures from
newspapers and elsewhere, the circuit prosecutor began handling drunkdriving cases.
One result of this change was that the police now have to apply first
to the circuit prosecutor's office to see if that office would prosecute a particular case. If that office declined, the police then take the case to the
city prosecutor to see if he will prosecute. While the police system for
processing drunk-driving cases is centralized, the prosecution system is
decentralized, with two prosecuting authorities acting independently of
each other, although there are no double prosecutions for the same act of
drunk driving. 21
The number of state prosecutions rises steadily from the middle of
1966 through the first half of 1967, and then it drops off, although the
decrease is not as great as that in the number of city prosecutions.
21. Changes in prosecutor policy are reflected in the orders of the St. Louis
Police Department concerning procedures for booking in drunk driving cases.
January 10, 1966. Book only on city charge.
May 4, 1966. Book only on state charge. (This was when the circuit prosecutor
began to prosecute drunk driving cases under the state statute).
June 27, 1966. Book on both the state and city charges. (The beginning of the
"double summons" period).
September 1, 1966 (teletype message) Book only on state charge.
September 2, 1966 (teletype message) Book on both state and city charges.
June 5, 1967. Book only on state charge. (Ending the period of "double summons").
June 28, 1968. Book on both state and city charges. (This is beyond the
period of this study).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 2

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

The reason for the drop in prosecutions is, of course, related to the
drop in arrests for during the last half of 1967 there was a sharp drop
in the arrest rate, and consequently fewer persons could be prosecuted.
However, the reason for the drop in arrests and prosecutions is not clear.
If, as has been indicated, the drop was due to a change in the attitude
of the prosecutors in refusing to prosecute, this could in turn lead to a
reduction in the number of arrests. -If the prosecutors were refusing to
prosecute, then there should be a drop in the percentage of those arrested
who are prosecuted. During the first half of 1967 there were 414 arrests
and 366 convictions or a conviction percentage of 88.4%. For the last
half of 1967 there were 279 arrests and 196 convictions for a percentage
of 70.3%. This gives some indication that the drop in convictions was due
to the actions of the prosecutors rather than the police. However, the
numbers involved are not great. Comparing arrests and convictions for
the same time period has the defect of the lag between arrest and conviction, but when investigating the effect of prosecutor behavior on police
behavior, no real time lag problem exists. Of primary interest is the way
in which what the prosecutor did in Month X affected the police in that
month. The arrests of a given month are not necessarily those involved
in the convictions for that month. It is the timing of the prosecutor's
decision which is important here and not the month of arrest.
For St. Louis, then, the implied consent law made it possible to
secure a higher percentage of convictions than had been obtained before.
One of the purposes of the law is to make conviction more certain, and
it has had that effect in St. Louis. It is possible that conviction for
offenses like careless and reckless driving, where drinking is suspected
but not proved, may have declined because they are now less necessary.
The decline in convictions and the rate of convictions during the last half
of 1967 may be due to a number of factors but there is no reason to believe
it is related to the implied consent law, except as it indicates that an implied
consent law alone will not insure a high rate of convictions. There are
other factors which can affect the conviction rate.
Kanzsas City. Using the convictions reported to the Department of
Revenue the percent of arrests resulting in convictions are:
No. Arrests
1964
1965
1966
1967

2,827
2,237
2,341
2,560
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1,191
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Percent
42.3
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These figures indicate that Kansas City not only has a much lower
conviction rate than St. Louis, but that the implied consent law had practically no effect on the rate of conviction. While it is reasonable to expect
a lower conviction rate in Kansas City than in St. Louis simply because
iii St. Louis only the very drunk are arrested, and one would expect a
high degree of successful prosecutions when only sure cases are ever brought
to trial. However, as noted before, in Kansas City persons who test out
at less than 0.15%7 are charged, and a greater percentage of these should
be acquitted. Even so, one would not expect a conviction rate in Kansas
City which is 30% below that of St. Louis. However, there is reason to
doubt the accuracy of these figures for these percentages are of the convictions reported to the Department of Revenue in Jefferson City which
were acquired in the same fashion as the figures for St. Louis.
A comparison of the number of convictions reported to Jefferson City
and the number of convictions claimed by the Kansas City police reveals a
large discrepancy.
No. of Convictions Reported
to Jefferson City

No. of Convictions Claimed
by Kansas City Police

1,195
1,161
1,258
1,310

1,829
1,603
1,695
1,927

1964
1965
1966
1967

The police convictions are from the annual reports of the Kansas City
police. Using these police figures the percentage of arrests resulting in
convictions is much higher.
Convictions
Arrests
(K.C. Police Figures)
Percent
1964
1965
1966
1967

2,827
2,237
2,341
2,560

1,829
1,603
1,695
1,927

64.7
71.7
72.4
75.3

These figures show a higher number of convictions and a slight increase
in the conviction rate after the adoption of implied consent.
It
While
known
lected

is not known which set of conviction figures (if either) is accurate.
police records, including the arrest figures for Kansas City, are
to contain inaccuracies, the police figures on convictions are colat least in part for the purpose of publication and are prepared
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by someone who is interested in something approaching an accurate
accounting. The police record of conviction could be inflated, but it
seems highly unlikely that the police would manufacture the number of
convictions which makes for the discrepancy between the police figures
and the convictions reported to Jefferson City. A more likely explanation, but one based on hypothesis not investigation, is that some of the
clerks of the various Kansas City courts are remiss in their duties of
reporting convictions.
The Kansas City annual police reports break down the dispositions
of persons arrested according to conviction, acquittal, cases pending, transfer to juvenile authorities, etc. Just taking those cases in which there was
a disposition during the year (that is, removing the "pending cases"),
the slight increase in the conviction rate after the implied consent law is
more apparent. This, of course, depends upon the police claim of the number
of convictions being accurate.

1964
1965
1966
1967

Total
Dispositions

Convicted

Acquitted or
Other Disposition

Percent
Convicted

2,721
2,261
2,224
2,506

1,829
1,603
1,695
1,927

892
658
529
579

67.2
70.9
76.2
76.9

Assuming the accuracy of the figures, the implied consent law results
in a better conviction rate in both cities. This accords with reasonable
expectations since the implied consent law results in there being more
reliable and more convincing evidence of intoxication to present to the
court and jury.
However, the convictions deal with two groups, those who consent
and those who do not. Those who refuse to submit to the test in most
instances have their licenses revoked for a year. In addition, some of
them are also convicted of drunk driving. There is no easy way of discovering how many of those who refuse to submit to the test are also later
convicted of drunk driving. During the summer of 1967, a manual examination of the records of the Department of Revenue in Jefferson City was
made to discover the number and location of refusals to submit to the
test. These files were also examined to see whether there was a later
conviction for drunk driving among those who had refused the test. A
conviction within three months was assumed to arise out of the same
arrest as the refusal. Table X shows the refusals later resulting in convictions
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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373

in both St. Louis and Kansas City. According to these figures, nearly
half, or 49%, of the refusers in St. Louis are later convicted, while in
Kansas City the figure is 36.4%.
TABLE X
DWI Convictions After Refusal to Submit to Test
St. Louis
J

F

X

A

!

1966 number of refusals
city convictions
state convictions

19 31 25 34 21
1 3 11
9 16
1

1967 number of refusals
city convictions
state convictions

26 22 32 29 29
18 17 15 10 19
3 1 3

J3

A

17 15 18
11 8
7
3
3

S

0

N

D TOTAL

17 44 36 30
8 8 19 14
7 4 2
2

307
115
22
148
79
7

Kansas City
1965 number of refusals
city convictions
state convictions
1966 number of refusals
city convictions
state convictions

60 61
21 28

1967 number of refusals
city convictions
state convictions

80 71 59
27 27 15

61

62 58

59

50

49

55

32 67 54
13 29 21

153
63
0

67 51 79

712
286
1

18 26 31 21 25 24 19 23 19 31
1

70
13
1

71
10

351
92
1

There is some variation in the rate of conviction of refusers. In
St. Louis, the rate is very low during January and February of 1966.
After that it ranges from a low of 26.5% to a high of 88.2%. Most of the
months have well over 50% conviction rate. The rate drops slightly in
April and May of 1967 which may be due to the delay between refusal
and conviction, and could mean that some of the convictions might not
have occurred or were not reported to Jefferson City at the time the
files were checked.
In Kansas City the rate of conviction of refusers starts at 40.6% for
the first month of operation (October 1965) and ranges between a low
of 29.5% to a high of 54.4% before falling off in March, April, and May
of 1967 to 25.4%, 20.0%, and 14.1%. This fall-off may also be due to
the delay between refusal and conviction as well as to a delay in reporting
the convictions to Jefferson City.
Using the period of March 1966 through February 1967 for St. Louis
and the period October 1965 through February 1967 for Kansas City, and
assuming that these periods more accurately reflect the normal conviction
rate for refusers, the conviction rate for refusers in St. Louis is 56.4%
and in Kansas City it is 39.87.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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However, as mentioned above, there is reason to doubt that all of
the Kansas City convictions are reported to Jefferson City. If the police
conviction claims are correct, then over a four-year period, 1964-1967, only
70% of the drunk-driving convictions have been reported to Jefferson
City. If the police claims are correct, and if the rate of nonreporting of
refuser's convictions is the same as the rate of nonreporting in all convictions, then instead of 404 convictions out of 1,016 refusals there should be
577 convictions for a percentage of 56.8%.
It is undoubtedly true that some refusers are later convicted of a
charge other than driving while intoxicated, the most likely charge being
careless and reckless driving. The reasons for such a prosecution rather
than one for drunk driving are first that, since the man has refused the
test, the only evidence of intoxication will normally be the officer's testimony,
and second, since the refuser has already lost his license (or will lose it
when the report of his refusal is sent in) it is felt that a further conviction
for drunk driving would be unduly harsh.
The implied consent law is no aid in securing the conviction of a
driver who refuses to submit to the test. Although the statute does not
specifically say so, it is believed that evidence of a refusal to take the
test is inadmissible in a prosecution for drunk driving. There is also not
the same necessity of prosecuting the refuser for he will suffer the sanction of revocation simply by virtue of refusing. Whether or not the refuser
is later convicted, the outcome from the police point of view is favorable
since the person arrested is punished. Therefore, the advantage of the implied consent law in securing conviction is only in those cases where drivers
submit to the test and fail.
If the number of convictions is reduced by the number of convicted
refusers, presumably the resulting figure should be approximately the
number of consenters who were convicted. If the number of arrests is reduced
by the number of refusers, the result should be the number of consenters
who were arrested (or at least nonrefusers). Using these figures the percentage rate of conviction for consenters in St. Louis for the period of
January 1966 through May 1967 is 869 convictions divided by 843 arrests
for a success ratio of 103.1%. This cannot be correct. However, the error
may be in the figures used which are not precisely accurate and which
do not coincide as to time: the arrests, refusals, and refusal convictions are
based on date of arrest; the convictions are based on date of conviction.
Even allowing for inaccuracies and the delay between arrest and conviction,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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the success ratio is very high in St. Louis. This is consistent with the test
results in St. Louis, where nearly everyone who took the test failed (scored
0.15% or higher). That the success ratio is high is reflected in a police
study of May 1967, which stated, "As of this date no case has been lost
where the D.P.C. test had been given and 0.15% blood alcohol has been
shown."
For Kansas City such a comparison is more difficult because of the
questionable accuracy of the conviction figures. If the police figures are
correct and are used, then a comparison can be made for the year 1966
(since the police convictions are yearly totals and are not broken down
by month). Also, if the figures for convictions of refusers are adjusted to
correspond to the police figures (for 1966 approximately 25% of the convictions were not reported), a comparison can be made.
For 1966 there would be 1,312 convictions divided by 1,629 arrests
for a conviction ratio of consenters (or at least nonrefusers) of 80.5%. Since
a number of persons arrested by the Kansas City police "pass" the test,
the conviction ratio should be less than that of St. Louis. Since it is
believed that Kansas City under-reports the number of actual arrests, their
conviction ratio may be even less.
During 1966, the test results from Kansas City show 1,261 persons
who tested out at 0.15% or higher. However, in Kansas City, unlike St.
Louis, the pass-fail line is around 0.10%, and in 1966 there were 354 persons who tested out between 0.10% and 0.14% making a total of 1,615
persons who "failed the test" in Kansas City. There were also 127 persons
who tested out between 0.05% and 0.09%, and 56 who scored less than
0.05%, and an additional 25 whose tests were defective or were not given
for some reason, for a total of 1,823. If the correct conviction total of
consenters (those who did not refuse) is 1,312, and there were 1,823 arrests
(as indicated by the number of persons tested); then the conviction rate for
consenters in Kansas City is only 72.0%. This apparently includes those
persons who were technically arrested, passed the test, and were released
without further record being made.
Because of the questionable accuracy of some of the figures, it is
impossible to state precisely the effect of the implied consent law on
revocations and convictions. However, it is clear that the law increases
results which are favorable to the police in that it punishes those the
police have arrested and believe ought to be punished. The police success
ratio goes up substantially after the law comes into effect. For the person
who is arrested and who refuses to submit to the test, there is an almost
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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automatic penalty: revocation of his driver's license. A further conviction
of the refuser is "just so much gravy" from the police point of view; the
penalty is already there. There is some doubt among the few police interviewed, particularly in St. Louis, as to whether the license revocation
system is as effective as it ought to be. In particular, some officers feel
there is not an effective system of obtaining the licenses of those who
refuse testing and suffer the resultant revocation. No investigation of this
aspect of the law has been made, but to the extent the police feel that
the refuser is not going to suffer revocation, the implied consent law suffers
as a contribution to police morale.
For the person who takes the test and fails, the result favorable to
the police is conviction. The implied consent law increases the number
taking the test and consequently increases the number who are convicted
with the evidence provided by the test. For those who are arrested and
who pass the test, there is no police-favorable result, but the police have
not necessarily "failed." This result is determined scientifically and is not
the result of a court decision, and is doubtlessly more readily accepted as
being the correct result than an acquittal in a court.
If every arrest that ends in either a conviction or a revocation is
considered an arrest resulting favorably to the police, the implied consent
law increases police favorable results. For 1964 and 1965 in St. Louis, the
ratio of favorable results is simply the percentage of arrests which result
in convictions, 47.7% in 1964 and 58.8% in 1965. It is possible the ratio
was higher, but the reporting of convictions to Jefferson City was not
as good in those two years as in later years. To get the ratio of policefavorable results for 1966 and 1967 it is necessary to add to the number
of convictions and the number of licenses which are revoked for refusal,
and then subtract the number of refusers who are also convicted (these
having been counted twice-once in the conviction total and once in
the revocation totals). For St. Louis the 1966 ratio of police-favorable
results is 102.5% and for the first five months of 1967 it is 100.8%. This
error may be due to small mistakes in the figures or to the time lag between
arrest and conviction.
For Kansas City, if the police conviction figures are used, the police
success ratio is 64.7% for 1964, 74.6% for 1965 (the last three months of
which were under implied consent), and the ratio rises to 86.5% for 1966.
These figures incorporate the police arrest figures, which are believed to be
understated since they seem to exclude from count those persons who were
arrested but who pass the test. The refusal conviction total was also adjusted
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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to reflect the higher rate of convictions claimed by the police rather than
the actual number reported to Jefferson City.
The main consequence of the implied consent law in both Kansas City
and St. Louis was to make the criminal process more efficient in the sense
that a greater proportion of persons arrested for drunk driving suffered a
penalty than before. If the figures can be believed, St. Louis has a perfect
record in efficiency. In view of the difficulty of obtaining accurate police
arrest statistics from St. Louis, it is reasonable to assume that the figures
finally obtained, while more nearly accurate than the early reports, still
have some errors in them, and that some arrests have been lost in the
process of computer record-keeping. Even assuming errors, the St. Louis
records indicate that nearly all those arrested for drunk driving either had
their licenses revoked for refusing to take the test, or were convicted of
drunk driving, or both. Since the St. Louis police arrest only the excessively
drunk, the high success ratio in St. Louis is not surprising.
If it is assumed that the police claims of convictions to be correct,
Kansas City shows an improvement after the implied consent law, which,
while significant, does not come up to the level of St. Louis. However, the
police in Kansas City not only arrest a sizable number of persons who test
out between 0.10% and 0.14% they also charge these persons with drunk
driving, and it is not surprising that not all of these charges result in
conviction.
In both cities the conviction rates go up and the police success ratio
increases substantially. The reasons are clear-the implied consent law
provides for the revocations upon refusal to submit to the test, and the
evidence acquired from the consenters makes it easier to obtain convictions. This combination should boost police morale for it means that the
chance of a favorable result (i.e., of some penalty being imposed) in each
case is high-and in St. Louis, coupled with the highly selective enforcement,
almost a certainty. Perhaps more important is what the implied consent
law avoids in many instances: that the arrested driver would obtain an
acquittal because the judge or jury would not believe or put much weight
in the arresting officer's testimony indicating intoxication. To lose a case
in this fashion can be a frustrating, humiliating, and discouraging experience
for a police officer. In such a situation he is a victim of the public's ambivalent
attitude toward drunk driving. Most persons want, or at least say they
want, strict enforcement of the laws on drunk driving, yet prosecuting
attorneys report that juries are reluctant to convict drunk drivers except
in clear-cut cases. This could be because the juror can identify with the
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defendant who claims to have had only a couple of drinks, and he is
reluctant to convict someone who is no worse than he is. The blood alcohol
test makes it much easier to convince the jurors (and the judge) that the
defendant was intoxicated, and thus it is easier to obtain a conviction.
From the policeman's point of view, the implied consent law is a very
useful tool. It puts him into the position where once he has made a proper
arrest of a drunk driver, he cannot fail to achieve a police-favorable result.
Implied consent is a police-oriented statute, and police responses seem
to vary from mildly favorable to enthusiastic. Data supporting this include
the slight initial increase in drunk arrests, the great increase in the number
of persons tested, the change-over to approved testing devices in St. Louis,
and the use of the revocation process by the police, where appropriate.
As a matter of common sense, a positive police response to such a law
is to be expected. Those officers who were interviewed favored the law,
but also expressed serious doubt; that it reduced the amount of drunk
driving. There was optimism about their role as enforcers of the law but
a characteristic pessimism about public response. The impact of the law
on police morale is positive, but this alone has had no substantial effect
on levels of enforcement.
The attitude of prosecutors is very similar to that of police. Implied
consent eases the prosecutor's burden in two significant ways. First, when
the test is taken, it makes obtaining convictions easier and discretionary
decisions about which cases to prosecute much easier. Second, when the
test is refused, revocation of the driver's license can ease pressure on the
prosecutor to obtain a conviction, because sanctions have already been
imposed on the errant driver. The prosecutors interviewed were in favor
of the law, but like the police, they doubted its effectiveness in reducing
drunk driving.
The implied consent law may have indirectly affected the emphasis
on prosecution of drunk-driving cases in the St. Louis circuit attorney's
office. Prior to May 1966, it was rare for any drunk-driving cases to be
prosecuted by that office. These cases were left to the city prosecutor's
office acting under the city ordinance. However, because of pressure which
can be traced in part to the adoption of the implied consent law, the circuit attorney began to prosecute drunk-driving cases. This change may
have had a discouraging effect upon the attitude of the police toward enforcing drunk-driving laws because it made the processing of drunk-driving
cases more onerous. 22 Moreover, it does not appear that prosecutors have
22. See, e.g., note 21 supra.
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campaigned for a greater emphasis upon enforcement of drunk-driving laws.
In sum, administrative attitudes have an independent significance. They
may influence the character of public response to a law, both by changing
administrative behavior and by communicating to citizens the feelings of
law enforcement officials about certain practices--often at a time when
the citizen's decision on whether or not to cooperate with a particular practice is in the balance. In Missouri, the attitudes of administrators to the
implied consent law seem moderately favorable, but only in Kansas City
and in the Highway Patrol has this motivated extra police or prosecution
efforts. Where attitudes toward enforcement of drunk-driving restrictions
were favorable prior to the implied consent law, there is some evidence
that the law has reinforced efforts to maintain high levels of enforcement.
But the law, even if well received, is not sufficient to escalate enforcement
where former levels have been low.

V. PUBLIC RESPONSE

A. Generally
This study sought to investigate two dimensions of the public response to implied consent in Missouri. First, data were sought that would
bear on the reactions of those individuals who were arrested and put on
the horns of the implied consent dilemma-in what proportions did they
consent or refuse, what changes appear over time in the pattern of response?
Second, data were sought that would bear on whether implied consent,
interacting with other laws and enforcement practices, had any impact on
the rate of drunk driving in the jurisdictions under study.
The most direct response to the implied consent law is the agreement
or refusal to submit to the test. However, that part of the "public" which
can make a response is only a small group-those arrested for drunk driving.
This group is, for the most part, a segment of a larger group, that portion
of the public who drives while intoxicated, which is still only a portion of
the driving public. Thus, in discussing the "public response" it is important
to remember that the "public" is really a group which varies in size (and
iepresentation) according to the response being considered.
The number of refusals which were reported and which resulted in
license revocations is known for the period from the beginning of implied
consent through May 1967. (See Table V.) The percentage of refusals is
shown in Chart F. In both cities studied the refusal rate appears low for
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the first month of implied consent. However, implied consent did not become effective until late in the first month. In St. Louis the proper equipment was not available until some time in January 1966, and in Kansas
City the implied consent law was not law until the middle of October 1965.
Thus in both cities during the first month, there was a period in which
refusals could not be reported to Jefferson City for revocation. In the first
full month of operation in both cities (February 1966 for St. Louis; November 1965 for Kansas City) the refusal rate was high (42% in St. Louis
and almost 37% in Kansas City) compared to the next several months
when the refusal rate drops. In Kansas City, however, the percentage of
refusals remains fairly constant, ranging between a high of 33% and a low
of slightly over 22%. In St. Louis, though after an initial decline to a low
of 28%, the rate fluctuates between 51% and 32%. One might expect a
high refusal rate immediately after the adoption of implied consent followed
by a tapering-off of refusals as the system is worked out and after the
constitutionality of the law has been established, and it is learned that
licenses are revoked for refusing. However, in St. Louis, one year after
implied consent, the refusal rate was higher than immediately after the
law, while in Kansas City it had declined slightly.
The effect of refusal is the same in both cities: revocation of license.
Also, in both cities there is the possibility of being convicted for drunk
driving with the stigma and penalty such conviction entails. In St. Louis
49% of those who refused were reported to Jefferson City as being convicted
of a drunk driving offense, whereas from Kansas City only 36.4% were
so reported. However, as has been noted, the reported convictions from
Kansas City are questionable, and it is likely the conviction rate of those
refusing to take the test is higher than the reported convictions would
show. 23 In addition, in Kansas City a greater percentage (11.6% as against
6.15% in St. Louis) of refusers are later reported to have been convicted
of another traffic offense, such as careless and reckless driving, and it is
likely that most of these convictions grew out of the arrest which led to
the refusal to take the test, particularly since this group lost their licenses
after refusal.
There is some difference in the consequences of conviction in the two
cities. In Kansas City the conviction will almost certainly be in a city
court where conviction carries only a six-point assessment against the
driver and, therefore will not result in license revocation. In St. Louis some
23. See discussion in Part III, supra.
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of the convictions will be in a state court (carrying a twelve-point assessment and automatic revocation), but the great majority will be in a city
court. Since the driver has already lost his license by refusal to take the
test, there is not much difference. However, in St. Louis, if a driver takes
the test and fails, he is almost certain to be convicted and stands a good
chance of being convicted in a state court. This has been true since mid1966 when the circuit prosecutor began to seek drunk-driving convictions.
In 1967 almost half of the convictions were in a state court.
The Kansas City alternatives are such that a driver risks less by taking
the test than by refusing. In St. Louis, the risk of taking the test can be
greater than refusing. Moreover, since the St. Louis test results show that
nearly everyone tested was drunk, it is likely that those who refused were
just as drunk-if not more so-than those who consented, and the high
refusal rate in St. Louis may be due to the effort on the part of the
refusers to avoid a conviction, at least a conviction of a state offense.
Despite the warnings and explanations given by the police, the arrested
driver may view his choice to be between (1) taking the test and being
convicted if he fails (and released if he passes), or (2) refusing the test
and having his license revoked, but avoiding conviction. But this is faulty
reasoning for this is not the choice facing the arrested driver: He may also
be convicted even after refusing. If the driver views his choice to be between consenting and risking conviction on the one hand, and refusing and
avoiding conviction (but losing his license) on the other, the more drunk
a person thinks he is the more likely he will be to refuse. Since St. Louis
arrests only the obviously drunk, this possible misunderstanding of the
choice may increase the number of refusals, and since the likelihood of
conviction does decrease on refusal, non-consent may also be rational in
St. Louis.
It is interesting to note that the Missouri Highway Patrol figures indicate a much lower refusal rate than either St. Louis or Kansas City. For
the years 1966 and 1967 the Highway Patrol reported 972 refusals to take
the blood-alcohol test for a refusal rate of 10.3% when compared with
9,475 requests to take the breath test. This compares with a 27.9% refusal
rate for Kansas City and a 37.1% refusal rate for St. Louis. One difference
between the Highway Patrol and the various city police is that all of the
Highway Patrol charges of drunk driving will be brought in state courts,
and the Highway Patrol figures indicate that the great majority of those
who refuse are charged with drunk driving. The chances of avoiding a state
conviction by refusing are not so good when arrested by the Highway
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Patrol. But the price of failing the test is higher than in Kansas City. It
may also be true that the Highway Patrol is just more persuasive in obtaining consent than are the city police. This may be due to a difference of
attitude on the part of the Highway Patrol toward the test. Several policemen in St. Louis expressed the view that a man "was a fool to take the
test" (presumably because he would almost certainly provide evidence
which would convict him of drunk driving). Other police, including Highway Patrolmen, have expressed exactly the opposite attitude, that a man
"was a fool not to take the test" (presumably because it could provide
evidence that would acquit him, and he would be no worse off for having
taken the test-even if he fails-since he loses his license anyway). Whether
these ideas are typical of the St. Louis police or the Highway Patrol is
not known, but it is possible that the police officer's own attitude concerning
the advisability of taking the test is intentionally or unintentionally communicated to the arrested driver and affects his choice.
The implied consent law was designed ostensibly to get drivers to submit to the test by providing a sanction for refusing. Yet the refusal and
subsequent license revocation may be a desirable end result, in many cases
perhaps even more desirable than the conviction obtained after a test
failure. From an administrative point of view the refusal revocation is
efficient and inexpensive. To an extent, the refusal becomes equivalent to a
plea of nollo contendere as the driver agrees to the penalty of license revocation, and the possibility of his being convicted is reduced. If the driver
were given the choice of refusing the test and losing his license but with
no further prosecution, or of taking the test and risking prosecution, the
refusal would be a sure form of nollo contendere and the taking of the test
a means of achieving vindication.
B. The Amount of Drunk Driving
One purpose of the implied consent law is to reduce the amount of
drunk driving by making the threat of conviction more meaningful, and
by deterring people from driving while drunk by revoking their licenses
and removing them from the road. Again, the "public" here is composed of
those who drive while intoxicated and those who are potential drunk
drivers. This group is larger than the group which is arrested and subjected
to the test, but it is still smaller than the general driving population, though
how much smaller is not known. Since 0.15% is the standard for being
intoxicated, the group is probably small when compared to the general
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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driving population. To improve the efficiency of the processes of enforcement operating against this group would be of great benefit to the system.
The smaller the group of potential drunk drivers in the population, the
more likely it is that the group is quite different from the general driving
population, and the response of the group to threats of prosecution and
license revocation may not be that expected from "normal" citizens.
The Department of Revenue records indicate that a number of persons
were convicted more than one time for drunk driving during the period
January 1964 through April 1967. There were 138 persons who had more
than one St. Louis drunk-driving conviction, and, assuming that each repeater had only two convictions, this would mean that these 138 persons
were 7.62%o of all persons convicted for drunk driving in St. Louis, and
accounted for over 14% of all convictions. For Kansas City there were 512
repeaters who, again assuming each repeater is convicted only two times,
constituted 14.22% of persons convicted for drunk driving in Kansas City
and accounted for nearly 25% of all convictions! The difference in rate
may be due to the more aggressive arrest practices of the Kansas City
police. The number and percentage of repeaters who were caught and
convicted in the period of slightly more than three years may indicate the
drunk-driving population is made up, largely, of a number of persons whose
drunk driving is not a single episode.
The theory of implied consent is that it makes the threat of conviction
or of revocation more credible and takes more drivers who drive while
drunk off the road and deters other drivers from driving while drunk. Thus,
implied consent, or so the hypothesis goes, reduces drunk driving.
The difficulty in testing this hypothesis is that there is no reliable
index for measuring the amount of drunk driving or for reflecting with any
degree of sensitivity changes in the amount of drunk driving. In the earlier
parts of this report, general accident figures and single car accident figures
were used, but these are very crude indications of the amount of changes
in drunk driving. The difficulty of finding a measure to reflect variations
in drunk driving is compounded by the necessity of determining how that
variable is related to drunk driving, which means that, before an index of
drunk driving can be determined, it is necessary to have an index of
drunk driving. For example, before variations in accident rates can be used
with any degree of reliability as indicators of variations in drunk driving,
it is necessary to know the relationship between drinking and accident
statistics.
As previously indicated, arrests cannot be used alone as an indicator
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of drunk driving since variations in enforcement occur from causes unrelated to the amount of drunk driving. When this study was begun it was
hoped to use certain measures as control factors. It was assumed that one
kind of case involving drinking that would come to the attention of the
police without any or with very limited exercise of police discretion would
be the accident in which drinking was a factor. It was hoped that the
number of accidents in which drinking was involved would provide an
index of fluctuations in the amount of drunk driving. But it was quickly
discovered that this was unworkable because the police did not classify
accidents according to those that, in their, opinion, involved drinking;
rather, such a classification acquired a secondary meaning-arrested for
drunk driving-and thus the listing of accidents involving drinking was a
matter of police discretion. Thus it became the policy in both St. Louis
and Kansas City not to list an accident as such unless an arrest was made
or a summons issued.
Another possible control was the indication of drunk driving involved
in the reporting of fatal accidents. There is still police discretion but, since
the fatal accident is a serious situation, there would be a tendency for the
police to record drinking more accurately. If the driver involved in a fatal
accident had been drinking, the officer would most likely want to arrest
him. If the driver were dead, then there would be no discretion to be exercised in deciding to arrest and the entry could be made without worrying
about its secondary meaning of arrest. Ho'wever, drinking fatality figures
also turned out to be unreliable. If the Haddon study figures are representative, the police were classifying very few' drunk fatality cases. The 1967
Kansas City police annual report does not include drinking as a factor in
any of the 86 traffic fatalities for that year, while the reports for prior
years did mention drinking in connection with some fatalities. While it
might be possible to check the individual police report on each fatal accident
to see if there is any notation of drinking being involved, it is doubtful
that the information gained would be worth the effort involved considering
the underestimates found in the annual reports. Further, the number of
fatalities is the smallest of accident samples, and consequently it is not
reliably sensitive to changes in the amount of drunk driving alone. A substantial percentage change could be due to chance or other causes in city
unit time comparisons. There is no easy way available to find out how
large the drunk driving public is or how much drunk driving is done. A
random sampling of motorists would violate constitutional rights for there
is no constitutionally acceptable way to compel a random sampling of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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motorists to submit to a breath or other test to determine if they are
intoxicated. However, it might be possible to require every driver involved
in an accident to submit to such a test, and this might be an effective
measure. Waiving penalties would help to establish for experimental purposes the constitutionality of this practice, or an implied consent law
covering all accidents could be tried.
A poll of drivers requesting that they report their own instances of
drunk driving is possible, but there are reasons to doubt that the results
would be reliable. Klette has conducted survey research on a sample of
Swedish drivers. 24 While his data were both interesting and suggestive,
basic validity problems remained to challenge the ingenuity of the social
researcher. First, any such questioning requires an individual to make
judgments about the level of his own intoxication at a prior point in time.
This task depends on the adequacy of the person's memory and may be
influenced by psychological processes which bias the driver's own perception
of his behavior, not to mention his degree of intoxication at the time. Many
individuals will be far less than candid about their behavior-even to the
point of being unwilling to admit even in an. anonymous interview situation
to having been drunk. (Candor may well be a special problem with
alcoholics.) Klette's findings, that only 3.5% of his sample reported instances of drunk driving within a year, leaves room for substantial suspicions
about the existence of a credibility gap in the self-reporting of drunk
driving. Further, if the drunk-driving population is relatively small, it would
take a large sample to get a significant number of drivers who drive while
drunk and an even larger sample to get a sufficient number of the even
smaller group of those who drive while drunk and have been arrested. However, it might still be productive to do the best survey possible, but such
a survey was beyond the scope of this study.
Rough measures such as accidents, single car accidents, fatalities, etc.
are difficult to use, for in addition to the problems mentioned above, the
variations in these figures can be due to factors other than drunk driving.
It is reasonable to believe that single car accidents can be more closely
correlated to drunk driving than accidents in general. Thus, comparing
single car accidents to the general accidents could give some indication of
the variation in the amount of drunk driving. The same approach could be
24. Klette, The Swedish Traffic Offender (1966 unpublished). See also Klette,
Thre Nordic Review of Criminal Criminal Science 119 (1964), and Klette. Thre
Nordic Review of Criminal Science 148 (1966). Both the published reports are
not in the English language. The authors relied on unpublished English translations
provided by Professor Klette.
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made using fatalities and accidents. However, the use of accidents as a
control for single car accidents or fatalities is questionable because the
accidents should also vary with the same factor-drunk driving-as do
single car accidents or fatalities, and an increase (or decrease) of drunk
driving might affect both sets of figures in the same general fashion. Moreover, each set of figures may be correlated to other factors. Single car
accidents may be closely correlated to driving conditions, icy roads, etc.;
fatalities may be more closely tied to speeding than are the general accident figures. However, these rough measures were the best available for
this study.
There are other possible measures which might have been used. If the
impact of the law is to cut down on drinking and driving it mighi be
possible to establish this by comparing the amount of drinking in public
to drinking in private homes (bar receipts vs. liquor store receipts) or to
note if there is an increase in taxi use on weekends. These rather indirect
measures also suffer from the defect that a change in them can be due to a
variety of causes other than the drinking habits of the driving public.
In addition to all of the difficulties mentioned, there is also the problem of the reliability of any records used. The reliability of arrest, accident,
and other figures used in this study has already been discussed and there
are shortcomings in these figures. Given the above disclaimers about adequate measures, what indications do the materials available give? The St.
Louis figures show little if any indication of a change, which could be
related to the implied consent law or which could be an indication of
either more or less drunk driving. The number of accidents (as indicated by
reports filed) shows a consistent increase year by year from 1964 through
1967. (See Chart G and Table XI.) The percentage of single car accidents
(see Chart H and Tables XII and XIII) to total accidents varies between
9.43t% in 1965 and 10.43% in 1967. The fatality figures for St. Louis show
considerable variation from year to year. The number of fatal accidents (not
fatalities) is 80 in 1964, 100 in 1965, 87 in 1966, and 101 in 1967. (See
TableXIV.) The number of nighttime fatal accidents (9 p.m. to 4:49 a.m.)
is 27 in 1964, 25 in 1965, 36 in 1966, and 35 in 1967. Presuming that nighttime fatal accidents would be more related to drunk driving than daytime
fatal accidents, the percent of fatal accidents which occur in the nighttime
is as follows:
1964
33.75%
1965
25.00o%
1966
41.39%
1967
34.65%
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TABLE xx
Accidents Reports riled by Police
St. Louis
,

Y

1964 1324

x2

1353

A

1531 1452

x

J

1593

J

A

1574 1677 1622

S

0

4

1580 1640

OTAL

D '

1570 1917

18,833

1965 i695 1558

1467

1833 1874 1675

1686 2170 20,793

1966 1568

1544

1493

1920

1826 1696 1870

1746 -1855 1932

1908 1988

1967 1752

1480

1798

1950

2186 1875

1879 1884

1780 2365 23,084

512 2071 1584 1668

1951

2184

21,346

TABLE XII
Accident Reports Indicating "Single Car" Accidents
St. Louis
J

I

x

A

14

3

1

A

S

0

N

14i

142

141

160

166

174

152

188

126

141

142

D TOTAL
180 1 ,853

180

138

152

143

196

132

172

155

171

162

171

189 1 ,961

170

135

136

201

167

157

171

183

213

218

195

224

2 ,170

201

190

222

166

236

176

207

178

189

203

166

274

2 ,408

TABLE XXII
Percent: Single Car Accidents of Total Accidents
St. Louis
7

14 -

A

it

3

3

A

S

0

17

10.62 8.86 10.36
11.47 12.84 12.35

TOTAL
9.84

9.12 8.67 10.14 8.71

9.43

9.15 9.26 9.14 10.48 11.48 11.28 10.22 11.27

10.17

9.46 9.46

10.84 8.74 8.11 10.47

D
§.39

10.65 10.50 9.21 11.02 10.42 11.06 9.06 11.59 7.97 8.60 9.04

8.51 10.80

8.33 10.31

8.46

9.39 10.61 9.47 10.03

9.29 9.33 11.59

10.43

8.65 9.17 11.44 .9.68

9.84

Xansas City
9.41 10..07

9.90 10.80 10.22 9.54

8.93 10.27

9.89

8.03

9.94 8.30

8.86 9.28

9.58

8.20

9.49 9.27 11.77 10.81 10.09 9.74 11.95

9.26 11.61

9.56 10.16 9.52

10.26

9.77 10.93 10.78 10.03 10.52 10.17 11.27

10.24

10.71 8.18
10.39

9.98 10.15

9.51
8.87

9.70 8.26
9.56
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TABLE XnV
St. Louis - Fatal Accidents
Night (9:00 p.m.-4:59 a.m.) and Day (5:00 a.m.-8:59 p.m.)
J

F

M

A

M

J

j

A

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

1964 night
day

3
5

2
2

0
3

3
6

.
2

3
5

1965 night
day'

3
6

2
5

1966 night
day

1.
9
2
7

2
3
2
2

2
0
5 10
0
2
3
3
2
1
4
6

3
2
6
1
4
7

0
3
4
3
5
2

2
4
4
6
4
3
2
0

6
3
2
8
6
4
5
7

2
3
1
5
3
7
3
4

1
7
3
5
6
5
1
5

2
4
2
7
1
5
3
9

2
9
3
13
3
5
5
13

27
53
257
75
36
5L
35
66

1967 night
day

TABLE XV
Percent Night (9:00 p.m.

-

4:59 a.m.) Accidents of All Accidents
St. Louis

S
1964

F

14

A

M

J

A

3

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

27.64 25.13 27.30 26.67 27.43 25.02 28.60 28.91 27.59 25.24 26.56 29.16

27.17

1965 26.25 23.81 24.61 26.67 26.70 23.67 26.98 27.61 28.39 26.21 23.67 27.83

26.21

1966 25.32 24.06 21.97 27.50 26.89 26.24 26.47 29.80 24.42 28.36 26.83 25.85

26.24

1967

26.83 30.06 27.96 25.23 28.23 25.92 29.37 29.27 24.95 26.37 26.97 29.22 27.53
Kansas City

1964

20.16

1965

(Monthly Figures Not Available)

20.20

1966

21.24 16.75 25.07 22.51 18.74 18.64 20.47 20.99 21.60 20.95 17.82 18.69

20.24

1967 20.08 19.88 23.00 19.03 18.12 20.49 21.56 19.42 20.36 16.01 18.00 22.42

19.8.

TALE XVX
Accident Reports Filed by Kansas City Police
Kansas City

3

F

x

A

J

A

1964 1658 1629

1627

1630

1897 1772

1746

1811

1583 1799

1853 2210 21,215

1965 1904 1796

1921

1692

1721 1865

1880

1941

1820 1952

1853 2318 22,663

1966 1591 2006

1895

2035

1894 1931

1925

1944

1843 1809

1919

2311 23,103

1967 1703

1440

1703

1915

1684

1771

1974 2224 1661

2360 21,670

1343

4

j

1884
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TABE XVII
Acdident Reports Filed Indicating Single Car Accidents
(collision v/fixed object, other object overturned,
ran off road, and other non-collision)

Kansas City
J

F

H

A

H

1964

156

164

161

176

192

1965

204

147

190

161

167

1966

151

186

223

220

1967

177

134

147

151

3

A

S

0

N

169

156

186

137

165

212

214 2,088

154

151

193

151

173

172

222

191

188-

230

180

214

173

195

220 2,371

183

184

184

191

198

234

169

266 2,218

IT

D

TOTAL
2,085

TABL XIIY
Single Car Accident (including collision w/parked car)

Kansas City
J

F

K

A

x

J

J

A

S

0

N

D

TOTAL

1964

407

416

403

414

463

475

463

463

402

449

504

609

5,468

1965

494

427

472

424

463

419

476

506

441

591

438

584

5,735

1966

405

447

549

508

480

493

525

498

486

441

495

599

5,926

1967

471

383

374

395

463

476

455

467

477

523

416

640

5,540

N

D

TOTAL

Percentage Accidents which are Single Car
(including collision w/parked car)
Kansas City
J

F

x

A

H

3

J

A

S

0

1964 24.55 25.54 24.77 25.46 24.41 26.81 26.52 25.57 25.39 24.96 27.20 27.56 25.77
1965 25.94 23.77 24.57 25.06 26.90 22.47 25.32 26.07 24.23 30.28 23.64 25.19

25.30

1966 25.46 22.28 28.97 24.96 25.34 25.53 27.27 25.62 26.37 24.38 25.79 25.92 25.65
1967 27.66 28.52 25.83 23.19 24.18 25.26 27.02 26.37 24.16 23.52 25.04 27.12- 25.56

TA LE XIn
Fatal Accidents - Night (9:00 p.m.-4:50 a.m.) day (5:00 a.m.-8:59 p.m.)
Kansas City

1964 night

J

F

X

A

X

J

J

A

S

0

W

D

TOTAL

3

2

2

3

2

3

2

4

0

3

5

1

30

day

1

7

5

2

2

6

7

4

2

4

4

3

47

1965 night

0

3

0

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

5

6

25

day

3

1

3

4

3

4

4

3

5

1

2

4

37

4

0

9

1

3

0

3

4

2

2

1

5

34

3

5

2

3

- 5

4

13

5

5

6

9

4

64

3
1

1
2

2
3

3
2

3
6

2
5

1
3

2
6

6

3
4

0
5

3
5

27
48

1966 night
day

1967 night
day
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These percentages reveal no apparent trend or sign of change. It is interesting to note that the raw number of nighttime fatalities in St. Louis has
remained fairly constant with a slight increase in the last two years. Most
of the yearly variation in fatal accidents is in the daytime fatal accident
category.
Nighttime accidents for St. Louis show the same pattern as total
accidents and single car accidents. (See Chart 1 and Table XV) There is a
perceptible increase over the four-year period. In St. Louis the percentage
of accidents which are nighttime accidents is consistent:
1964
1965
1966
1967

27.17%
26.21%
26.24%
27.53%

The monthly percentage is also fairly constant ranging from a low of 24.06%
in February 1966 to a high of 29.22% in December 1967. From these figures
it is possible to conclude that if the implied consent law has had any effect
on the amount of drunk driving in St. Louis, it is not apparent from using
these measures.
The Kansas City figures do show some change. The accident reports
filed (see Chart G and Table XVI) show an increase in accidents during
1964, 1965, and 1966 but a decrease in 1967. The 1967 totals are less than
1966 and 1965, *and 1967 is the only year of the four in which Kansas City
has fewer accidents than St. Louis. The single car accident figures (see
Chart H and Table XVII) are similar with a pattern of steady increase
from 1964 through 1966 and then a drop in 1967, especially during the first
half of 1967. The percentage of accidents which were single car accidents
(excluding collision with parked cars) shows a pattern similar to that of
St. Louis. They vary from a low of 9.20% in 1965 to a high of 10.26% in
1966. There is, however, a slight decrease in the percentage of accidents
which are single car accidents during the first six months of 1967, the time
when the apparent decrease in accidents in Kansas City is the greatest. For
the first six months of 1967 the percentage of single car accidents is 9.76%
compared to 10.64% for the rest of 1967 and 10.21% for the first half of
1966. However, when "collision with parked cars" is added into the single
car accident figure, there is much less difference during the first half of 1967
and the rest of the four-year period, 1964-1967 (see Table XVIII).
The fatality figures for Kansas City vary from year to year. The number of fatal accidents (not fatalities) is 77 in 1964, 62 in 1965, 98 in 1966,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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and 76 in 1967 (see Table XIX). The per cent which are ;nighttime fatal
accidents are as follows:
1964
1965
1966
1967

38.96%
40.329o%
34.69%o'
36.00%.
(excluding 1 for which the time is unknown)

The nighttime accident figures for Kansas City (see Chart I and Table
XV) show a variation similar to that of total accidents. The monthly totals
for 1964 and 1965 were not available and only averages are shown for those
two years; 1967 shows the same drop as is found in the charts showing total
accidents and single car accidents. The percentage of accidents in the nighttime are as follows:,
1964
1965
1966
1967

20.16%b
20.20%
20.24%
19.81%

There is very little variation from year to year although there is a drop in
1967. It is interesting to note that while Kansas City has more accidents
(except for 1967) than St. Louis, Kansas City consistently has fewer (both
in total number and percentage) nighttime accidents than St. Louis.
The Kansas City figures are also inconclusive in showing any change
in the amount of drunk driving. There is a decrease in the number of accidents of all types in 1967 as compared with 1966, a decrease which is difficult
to account for. It is more notable in the first half of 1967, and it is possible
there is some correlation between this decrease and a decrease in the amount
of drunk driving in Kansas City, but this is nothing more than a suspicion
for the change may be due to other causes. One possible cause is that the
Kansas City police department ceded jurisdiction over interstate highways
in Kansas City to the Highway Patrol. This occurred in 1966 and may have
affected the number of accidents reported by the Kansas City Police in
1967. On the other hand, since single car accidents decline more than total
accidents figures, this may not be a complete explanation. It may be that
the aggressive enforcement of the drunk-driving laws aided by implied consent is reducing accidents in Kansas City, but there is, as yet, no way of
telling.
If the implied consent law does have any effect upon drunk driving,
it could be through either general or special prevention. Special prevention
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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is the preventive effects of the sanction imposed as it operates on those who
are arrested and tested. Even those who pass the test are aware that the
threatened sanction is a real one. Those whose licenses are revoked or who
are convicted (and some suffer both sanctions) are certainly aware that
the threat of the law is one which will be carried out. Presumably, revocations both from refusals and convictions also result in these persons being
removed from the highway for awhile. How effective the system is in
keeping these persons from driving is not known. Some suspicion was expressed by the police, the prosecutors, and members of the staff of the Department of Revenue that drivers-the number unknown-were avoiding
the effect of revocation by securing new driver's licenses using a different
name. How widespread this practice might be, and how many persons are
driving while their licenses are revoked is not known. However, the license
revocations must result in some reduction of drivers thus deprived.
There could also be a general preventive effect. As the threat of enforcement against drunk driving becomes more cerdible with the implied consent
law, the theory of general deterrence is that this threat will reinforce whatever other forces deter people from driving after drinking. The nature and
existence of general deterrence is an area where a serious gap exists between what we know and what we ought to know, and this is true for
the whole of criminal law and not just that proscribing drunk driving. It
may well be that most drunk drivers (those who will test out at 0.15%o or
higher) are alcoholics or close to it, that they suffer from a compulsion to
drink, which most drivers do not suffer from, and a compulsion to drive.
It may be that general deterrence is not effective upon such a group and
that even special deterrence is not of great significance.
Great Britain's experience with the Road Safety Act of 1967 casts some
light on the adequacy of some measures of testing variations in drunk
driving, and on the relevance of general prevention in drunk driving. Shortly after the effective date of a new British law redefining and making
more credible that government's threat against drunk driving, and providing for breathalizer tests, total traffic fatalities and night fatalities decreased
so dramatically on a national basis that it is difficult to deny the relationship between drunk driving and these events as an index of fluctuations of
drunk driving. 25 With a sample that large and fluctuations that substantial,
these measures have achieved at least a partial validation. Great Britain's

25. See Great Britain Ministry of Transport, press release March 8, 1968.
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experience also indicates that drunk driving, as it is experienced there, is
susceptible to general prevention strategies. Whether the difference between
Britain's dramatic record and the inconclusive observations reported above
relates to a difference in the intensity of countermeasures adopted against
drunk driving or to a difference in the quality of the problem of drunk
driving, or to a difference in the responsiveness of the populations, or to all
three, is .not known.
The results in both Kansas City and St. Louis make it difficult to conclude that the implied consent law had any effect on the amount of drunk
driving. However, common sense tells us it is unlikely that the law had the
effect of increasing drunk driving-it either reduced it or had little or no
effect.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The major purposes of this study were two-fold. The first was to
examine the available records which might help measure the effects of
implied consent, and to determine the adequacy of these records as a
means of providing research data. The second was to attempt to determine,
as far as the records would permit, the effects of adopting an implied consent
law.
As to the first object:
1. More and better records are needed for meaningful research and to
create conditions which make it possible for an administrative agency to
inform itself about its own operations and to review its polices effectively.
Police records, which provided most of the data, lacked precision, and in
some instances, reliability. These deficiencies may be due to the transition
from file to computer storage, but whatever the cause, more consistent
monitoring of records is needed.
2. Meaningful research into the effects of policies aimed at the reduction of drunk driving requires an accurate index of drunk driving. There is
none at present. Acquiring such an index should be a high priority aspect of
any future research. Validity is a serious problem. Recent experience suggests that fluctuation in fatal accidents in a short-run situation may be a
valid measure of fluctuations in drunk driving. Sensitivity is a second problem. Fatalities are statistically few, and the number varies independently
of drunk drying. Research could be directed at investigating the role of
alcohol in nonfatal single car accidents occurring at night in the hope of
developing an index of fluctuations in drunk driving. Other measures, such
as tavern receipts, etc., might prove fruitful but are speculative exercises
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/2
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at this time. A substantial commitment of resources toward finding measures
of fluctuations in drunk driving is merited by the need. Laws requiring those
involved in accidents to submit to blood-alcohol tests on pain of license
revocation would make research of this kind much easier, even though
this might depress by itself the level of drunk driving. In addition, there
is an obvious problem of an additional encroachment on individual freedom
both from the constitutional and moral aspects. If proper testing equipment
is available, the degree of the encroachment can be small, and the selection
of the group to be tested does not appear unreasonable in view of the
usefulness of the information gained in reducing the amount of drunk
driving.
As to the second object:
1. We have compared two divergent implementations of implied consent laws. 'In Kansas City, individuals suspected of drunk driving are not
frozen into police statistics in ways that would make the police hesitant to
arrest the apparently drunk as opposed to the clearly drunk driver. In St.
Louis, drivers are frozen into police statistics, testing is centralized, and
the police are apparently much more hesitant about invoking the process.
Centralization of testing, among other things, increases the cost per test to
the enforcing agency and the driver affected.
Great Britain's system carries the logic of decentralization, screening,
and minimum cost much further than either the Kansas City or St. Louis
systems. Portable breathalizer kits are carried by the police and used in
the field as a preliminary screening device. If an individual fails this test,
he is arrested and urged to have a more accurate blood test taken at a
police station. This kind of preliminary screening is worthy of serious consideration. Even in Kansas City, where testing is decentralized, there is a
substantial police resource cost associated with each test. One of the principal drawbacks of the Kansas City testing procedures as a screening device
is the police and citizen time cost per test. If portable instruments can
effectively screen drivers in the field, it would be wise to use such field tests
to determine who should be subjected to further and more reliable tests.
The implied consent law could be rewritten to cover both types of
tests. To the extent that the cost in time of present testing is a deterrent
to a more aggressive police policy on drunk driving, the implementation
of portable field tests could be expected to encourage more stopping and
testing of drivers. The evidence of short term success of the British program
in reducing measures of drunk driving cannot be reliably extrapolated,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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however, so as to make similar claims about the imposition of field testing
in the United States. In the first place, it may be that our constitutional
standards for arrest are higher than those set by the Road Safety Act of
1967 for Great Britain. It may also be that they are not. This is a difficult
year to predict just what the minimum constitutional standards for police
intervention will be in the area of drunk driving. In the "stop and frisk"
cases, the United States Supreme Court 26 qualified the traditional requirement that a police officer must have probable cause before stopping an
individual and subjecting him to a search. The Court approved cursory
searches for weapons on less than probable cause where that practice can
be considered reasonable in view of the necessity for police self-defense.
It might be that the court would uphold field testing for drunk driving on
less than probable cause to arrest. Certainly, the less the time and cost of a
particular device used for police screening, the more likely it would seem
that stopping drivers to use the device would not be considered "unreasonable."
Secondly, Great Britain's general population, its population of drivers,
its population of drinkers, and its population of those who are likely to drive
after drinking could be very different from the corresponding groups in
the United States.
In the third place, there are indications that traffic accident and fatality patterns in Great Britain are different from patterns in the United
States. The per million mile fatality rate in Great Britain is significantly
higher than that of the United States. While a number of factors-chiefly
road congestion and differences in highway engineering-might explain
those differences, it could not be assumed that drastic changes in drunkdriving enforcement in this country would cause changes of the same magnitude as those noted in Great Britain.
The British experience, however, is consistent with the finding of a
difference between the Kansas City and St. Louis implementation of implied
consent. Field testing, the minimization of test costs, and the use of chemical tests as a screening device appear to be an attractive extension of the
nascent testing regime under implied consent in Missouri.
2. Implied consent laws make the administration of drunk driving laws
easier. The law can be considered as an adjunct of the criminal control
process, or conceivably, it could be used in regulatory systems which de26. See Terry v. Ohio, 390 U.S. - , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Sibron v. New
, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).

York, 390 U.S. -
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pend upon license revocation as a first line of defense. Because revocation
upon refusal is automatic, the refusal-revocation mechanism becomes to
some extent an independent administrative system. The implied consent law
guarantees that the arrested drunk driver will lose his license, or be convicted, or both. The law has also introduced a measure of science to most
criminal drunk-driving cases, and thus made the administration of law
easier for police and prosecutors. The principal costs of the system are the
time spent by the police and the citizens. Reducing these costs by shortening
the processing time of drunk drivers, would result in substantial savings of
the already scarce police resources and would make broader enforcement
more attractive.
3. There is no concrete indication that the implied consent law, alone
or in conjunction with other policies, reduced drunk driving below levels
which would have been experienced in the absence of implied consent.
There are some indications that Kansas City outperformed St. Louis,
because its relative accident experience improves over the period covered
by the study, but this cannot be attributed to any particular factor.
4. The refusal-revocation system is a potential administrative substitute for the use of the criminal process in dealing with drunk drivers. We
can imagine a system in which an individual loses his license for a year by
administrative revocation upon refusal to take the test and suffers the
same penalties if he takes the test and fails it. Such a system would lose
whatever extra measure of deterrence is achieved by the other criminal
penalties now threatened. Such a system might however, encourage a lower
blood alcohol point of failure and broader enforcement. This administrative
system would depend upon an essential assumption shared with the criminal process: that license revocation is an appropriate sanction and preventive measure in the area of drunk driving control. So very little is known
about the effect of various countermeasures that the assumption that this
or any other strategy is effective is largely a matter of faith. There is an
immediate need to find out whether such faith is justified. In sum, implied
consent helps to rationalize the administration of a process whose central
tenets remain unexamined and unproved. Given present information about
the magnitude of the problem of drunk driving, and the present assumptions
about appropriate drunk-driving policies, implied consent is a modest improvement and seems worth its cost.
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